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Opsomming
Hierdie navorsingsverslag dokumenteer die uitkomste van 'n studie wat daarna streef om die
potensiële bydrae van vroue tot konflik resolusie te ondersoek. Tot hierdie end word die
Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo as 'n gevalstudie gebruik. Die navorsings ontwerp is
eksploratories en beskrywend en daar word ekstensief gebruik gemaak van beide primêre en
sekondêre bronne van data.
Deur aan te voer dat 'n gender perspektief op konflik die wyse waarop vroue verskillend
geraak word deur konflik beklemtoon, volg dit logies hierop dat vroue toegelaat behoort te
word om hul regmatig plek in te neem ten tyde van pogings tot konflik transformasie. Die
toepassing van 'n gender perspektief dwing verder ook 'n hersiening van konflik resolusie en
beskou konflik bestuur en transformasie as die gepaste maniere om oorlog tot 'n einde te
bring. Dit bring mee dat daar 'n verskuiwing van klem plaasvind - vanaf 'n soeke na
politieke oplossings na konflik voorkoming en vroeë/tydige waarskuwing as die mees
effektiewe instrumente om geweldadige konflik en die ineenstorting van vredesprosesse te
voorkom. In die soeke na die gepaste rol vir vroue in konflik bestuur, herondersoek die
studie 'n aantal raamwerke vir die volledige en gelyke deelname van vroue in konflik bestuur
op die internasionale, regionale en sub-regionale vlakke van analise. Hierdie raamwerke
word dan toegepas op die situasie in the DRK, en praktiese riglyne word voorgehou. Hoewel
die studie vind dat daar 'n duidelike gedefinieerde behoefte bestaan om die gender
vooroordeel in die analisie en resolusie van konflik the openbaar, word dit ook aanvaar dat
die patriargale aard van die DRK en die internasionale sisteem in die meeste gevalle ware
vooruitgang in die daarstelling van 'n nie-patriargale, gelykregtige, vreedsame sosiale
wêreldorde sal kniehalter.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Abstract
This research report documents the results of a study that aims at investigating the potential
contribution of a gender perspective towards conflict resolution. In this regard, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is used as a case in point. The study takes the
form of an exploratory and descriptive study and extensive use is made of both primary and
secondary sources of data.
By arguing that a gender perspective on conflict will elucidate the way in which women are
affected differently by conflict it logically follows that women should be permitted to assume
their rightful positions in attempts at transforming conflict. The application of a gender
perspective furthermore urges a revision of conflict resolution towards conflict management
and transformation as the appropriate ways of bringing an end to war. This implies that the
emphasis is shifted from a search for political solutions towards conflict prevention and early
warning as the most effective ways of pre-empting violent conflict and the breakdown of
peace-processes aimed at resolving violent conflicts. In the search for an appropriate role for
women in conflict management, the study revisits a number of frameworks for the full and
equal participation of women in conflict management at the international, regional and sub-
regional levels of analysis. These frameworks are then applied to the situation in the DRC
and some practical courses of action are proposed. While the study concludes that there is a
clearly defined need for exposing the gender bias in the analysis and resolution of violent
conflict, it notes that the patriarchal nature of the DRC and the international system will in
many instances hamper progress towards the achievement of a non-patriarchal and non-
gendered peaceful social world order.
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CHAPTER I:METHODOLOGY
1.1 BACKGROUND
An estimated 2,8 million people have lost their lives in the war in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) since 1997 and Conflict Resolution in the DRC is an issue which has
certainly found its way onto the world's agenda. The current conflict in the country has
defied the contemporary conventional wisdom with regard to inter-state African wars, and it
has also proven the inadequacy of conventional conflict resolution strategies.
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RATIONALE
It is proposed that an in-depth study be done on the gendering of conflict resolution in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo where, what has been called Africa's First World War,
has been raging for the last four and a half years (Breytenbach, et. al., 1999: 33 &
Lemarchand, 2000: 349, etc.). There have been several attempts at resolving this conflict -
none of which have yet proven its sustainable success.
Conflict Resolution has evolved as a distinct sub-field within Conflict Studies under the
discipline of International Relations. As such, conflict resolution strategies are invariably
rooted firmly in the theoretical frameworks that have evolved and now prevail within
International Relations. Critical theory, feminist theory and peace studies (amongst others)
have gained increasing prominence in International Relations in lieu of traditional theories
(here referring mostly to realism, and the varieties of idealism and liberalism) that could not
provide satisfactory explanations of social reality. This has resulted in a number of changes
within Conflict Resolution practice, such as a shift towards so-called 'two-track diplomacy',
'second', or 'fourth generation conflict resolution', and so forth (Van Schalkwyk, 2001a).
Through the proposed research, it will be argued, however, that, although some positive
developments have taken place, it is suspected that some more dramatic changes are needed
within the realm of conflict management in order to resolve complex threats to a peaceful and
stable world order such as presented by the DRC war.
1
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Using existing theoretical frameworks for conflict and conflict resolution as a point of
departure, the purpose of this study is thus to highlight an alternative theoretical framework
for conflict management that is based on a process of gendering - of both conflict and
conflict resolution theory and strategies. The theoretical component will be embedded in an
empirical analysis of the DRC - and the place of gender as an explanatory device within that
context - as a specific case in point.
1.3 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW
A preliminary literature review has been undertaken in order to reveal some basic factors
with regard to the DRC conflict and its dynamics, and to determine whether Gender Theory
and/or Feminism have articulated and applied a distinct theoretical framework to conflict
resolution. The results of this literature review will elucidate the title of this research project.
1.3.1 GENDERING
Gendering refers to two ongoing "projects": the deconstruction of gender-biased knowledge
claims (revealing androcentrism in fundamental categories, in empirical studies, and in
theoretical perspectives) and the reconstruction of gender-sensitive theory (rethinking
fundamental relationships of knowledge, power and community and the developing of
feminist epistemologies). The idea of gendering is born of the feminist claim that the
codification of social scientific knowledge has excluded women to the extent that existing
knowledge claims about human experience may be called 'man's knowledge' and as such
does not take cognisance of the true complexities of social existence (Peterson, 1992: 6).
1.3.2 CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DRC
Conflict Resolution in the DRC has been problematic to say the least. As mentioned earlier,
the current conflict in the country has defied the contemporary conventional wisdom with
regard to internal African wars, and has drawn in at least eight of the surrounding African
2
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states. Other external involvement includes the deployment of a 5,000 member strong UN
Peacekeeping Force in the DRC, while a number of NGO's, churches and other welfare
organisations are active in trying to bring some relief to the war-ravaged population. Many
more states and role-players are said to be directly or indirectly and informally involved.
The current war in the DRC is underwritten by a condition of structural violence that extends
into the entire Great Lakes Region (Havermans, 2000: 3-5; Lemarchand, 2000, Kabemba,
1999: 1-3). Colonialism has - as elsewhere in Africa -left a mess of arbitrary boundaries and
divided peoples. With the withdrawal of the imperial powers and later the two Cold War
powers (the United States and the Soviet Union) weak state structures were left exposed to
the threats and demands of a strange African concoction of communalism, ethnocentrism,
parochialism, patriarchy, corruption(ism) and other ugly monsters. Against this background,
some commentators have traced the roots of the so-called 2nd rebellion directly to the 1994
genocide in Rwanda. And there is relative consensus around the citizenship issues of the
Tutsi people in the Eastern Congolese Kivu province (known as the Banyamulenge) being
central to understanding the conflict dynamics (Van Schalkwyk, 2001a).
The complexity of the DRC war, the extent of the devastation it has wreaked and its track
record of failed attempts at achieving a negotiated settlement, urges a critical investigation of
the paradigms underlying conceptions of state, security, conflict and peace (Ogunsanya &
Mngqibisa, 2000: 1). It would appear that the logic of self-help, and violence and power as
the only means to attain security has defined the DRC war in all its dimensions. This has
extended into conflict resolution efforts that have been characterised by a state-centric
approach operationalised in so-called one-track diplomacy where only the belligerents are
regarded as legitimate participants (Naidoo, 2000: 1-4). The Lusaka Peace Accords of July
1999 presented a partial departure from peacemaking efforts focussing solely on the
belligerents towards a two-track diplomacy whereby citizens are to be actively involved in
conflict management (Naidoo, 2000: 1-4). The term "capacity-building" has also been widely
associated with this paradigm shift in conflict resolution strategies (Ogunsanya & Mngqibisa,
2000: 3).
3
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1.3.3 FEMINISM ANDGENDER THEORY
As will become clearer in the ensuing chapters, this study contends that the value of feminist
contributions to conflict resolution lies in the application of a gendered approach as opposed
to a purely feminist analysis. Related to this is an implied shift from thinking about conflict
resolution towards rather thinking about conflict management - an all-inclusive, realistic and
continuous process.
Ellen Berg (1994: 2, 3 & 10) who has done groundbreaking work in the field of feminist
theorizing about conflict resolution came to the conclusion that the contemporary
contribution of feminism to conflict resolution and peacemaking is found, above all, in
feminist theory. Feminism presents a distinct way of looking at how people make sense of
their social world. A feminist perspective may suggest that neither changing societal
institutions nor changing its socialization of new members is sufficient; our very mode of
knowing (of perceiving and conceiving) must be changed if the aspiration for peace is to be
fulfilled.
Following another strand of feminist theory, Berg (1994: 9) contends that "the
psychologically grounded dedication to verbal engagement and reconciliation attributed to
femininity has profound implications for conflict resolution, especially when wedded to the
principle that Gilligan (in Berg, 1994: 9) finds ultimately guides the ethic of care: to do the
least harm". It is difficult to envision the DRC belligerents worrying more about doing less
harm, than more. However, if they are made aware of the fact that there are connections
between parties, prompted to understand each party's interests and emotions (particularly
with regard to the issue of the Banyamulenge and other non-indigenous Tutsi people in the
DRC who have been living there for decades), and encouraged to keep communications open,
some common ground may emerge where they can realise that continued fighting harms
everyone's interests unnecessarily (Berg, 1994: 9).
As mentioned before, structural conditions - ethnically and historically embedded - form the
basis of conflict and violence in the Great Lakes region. Feminist social construction theory
reminds that there is little to be gained by the age-old game of nationalist and sectarian
politicians of shifting the burden of guilt and has incessantly and vigorously fought the
perception of permanence and inertia associated with structural conditions (Thompson, as
quoted in Burguieres, 1990: 10 & Berg, 1994: 5-6). This kind of analysis ends the depiction
4
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of one party as victims, helpless to shape their destiny, and of the other party as evil
oppressors, helpless to stop their victimizing activity, forcing both parties to assume
responsibility for their past and future without the escape hatch of blaming the whole sorry
mess on abstract, immutable social forces. In a similar vain, feminist social construction
theory reveals the complicity of both men and women in sustaining militarism and posits a
strong counter-position on peace, building a strong feminist framework based on a common,
ungendered 1 foundation for peace. It argues for the role of feminism in dismantling the
imagery that underlines patriarchy and militarism - assigning responsibility to both men and
women for opening paths to non-violent interaction.
Other feminist contributions to conflict resolution discourse can be found in their rejection of
the dichotomous theoretical constructs that permeate international relations thinking. Clear-
cut distinctions between private/public, war/peace, and them/us are not regarded by feminism
as representative of social reality. Wide citizen involvement and the humanitarian impact of
the fighting in the DRC have been indicative of this fading distinction between public and
private, battleground and backyard.
1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES
Despite attempts at track two diplomacy and the wide participation of domestic and
international NGOs in peace building processes in the DRC, conflict resolution efforts to date
appear to remain grounded in the realist/patriarchal perspective that still greatly underlies not
only conflict resolution discourse, but also the understanding of international relations in
general. As a result, conflict management processes remain, in essence, attempts at conflict
resolution, and significant groups remain outside mainstream processes while deep-rooted
structural issues remain ignored by official negotiators. Top-down approaches also tend to
dominate, and a lack of capacity-building and attention to the imperatives for early warning
and other preventative mechanisms to be established in anticipation of future relapses
continue to characterise peace-making efforts.
1 Indicating a situation where gender differences do not provide a basis for discrimination
5
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Hence it will be asked whether prospects for lasting peace can be enhanced by gendering
conflict resolution in the DRC. The application of gendered perspectives provides a
coordinating framework for addressing many of these problems and hence, some of the
causes of the repeated failure of conflict resolution attempts in the Congo. It urges analysts
and practitioners to look beyond political power dynamics, revealing the true sources of
power, the un-sustainability of those sources of power; and uncovers options for establishing
a society based on principles of inclusivity and resource expansion.
This study hopes to clarify the relevance of a gendered approach to International Relations
and Conflict Resolution through expanding the practical application of theory. A limited
literature review has not revealed any prior attempts at merging the wealth of work done on a
theoretical and practical level with the analysis of a specific case within the African context.
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN
Against the above background, it is proposed that the present study be conducted within the
qualitative paradigm and the choice of research design is consequently prescribed by the
specific nature of the research question to be answered. An amalgamation of a thorough
literature review and empirical case-study evidence is envisioned to result in some limited
non-empirical conceptual analysis and incidental theory building. The units of analysis are
thus drawn from both 'Worlds' as referred to by Mouton (2001: 51). World 1 objects are of
an empirical nature, indicating empirical problems - in this case the resolution of the conflict
in the DRC - while World 2 objects include references to the non-empirical world of
scientific concept or notions, theories and models and schools of thoughts, or world-views.
This implies an exploratory study rather than one that is aimed at description or explanation.
Non-empirical meta-analytic, conceptual, theoretical, and philosophical or normative
questions are thus to be asked throughout the project (Mouton, 2001: 55).
This study will be exploratory in as far as the basic objective is concern, but will inevitably
take a number of 'descriptive' turns as it attempts to outline the context of conflict resolution
within the DRC and seeks to determine why previous efforts have failed to yield the expected
peace dividends.
6
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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS
Data for the literature review will be gathered from a variety of textual sources such as books,
monographs, conference proceedings, reference materials, journal articles, newspapers,
magazines, reports, theses and dissertations. Official governmental sources and primary
sources, such as copies of treaties and personal interviews are to be used to supplement the
secondary data. Most of these (documentary) sources are available or obtainable through the
university information service and extensive use will also be made of the Internet and other
computer-based sources of information. Potential interviewees are identified through these
means and approached by the researcher on a personal and individual basis or via electronic
means.
Based on the chosen means of data collection, specific care will be taken to avoid some of the
common errors associated with the use of secondary and textual data as warned against by
Mouton (2001: 106). These may include researcher distortion based on pre-conceptions and
prejudices, and personal bias with regard to the selection of data and interviewees. When
attempting to answer a specific research question (and thus implicitly support a specific
hypothesis), as is the case here, research expectancy' must be guarded against.
The theory-building aspect of the study presents particular obstacles and care is to be taken to
formulate postulates which make plausible claims on reality, are conceptually coherent,
consistent, and relatively flexible (Mouton, 2001: 177). The chosen research design implies
an exercise in inductive reasoning and grounded theory (Mouton, 2001: 150& 177). This will
be pursued at the hand of three broad 'projects' within the study:
1. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has many dimensions. A complex
range of actors are involved and the conflict has taken various forms (Kabemba, 1999: 1-
3 & Ibeiki-Jonah, 2002). The impact on the society and living standards has been
devastating and the situation is worsening with every day that the conflict drags on. The
first phase within this research would thus be to 'map' the relevant conflict and conflict
2 Research expectancy results when the researcher or interviewer subtly communicate an expectancy that the
subject fulfils - this may both in the case of personal interviews, observations and the use of documentary
sources (Mouton, 2001: 106)
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
resolution processes through scrutinizing documentary data sources. Specific areas of
focus would include the historical context, perceived causes, participants, duration,
ethnicity and its role, the intensity of the conflict, and the impact of the war on women
and children.
2. A gendered analysis of conflict resolution processes will then ensue. There is a
considerable and growing body of literature on feminism and gender theory and conflict
and conflict management/resolution. Theorists and practitioners have been looking at the
role of women in conflict and conflict management and have also looked at how the
principles entrenched in gender theory is a rich resource for conflict resolution (Berg,
1994: 3). The other side of gendering implies a reconstruction - of theory and practice -
to include the gender dimension, and it is proposed that this be applied to conflict
resolution in the DRC.
3. In the last section the focus shifts towards the ultimate goal of the research. By
contextualising the case study within its broader environment and assessing the role of
various actors in implementing the lessons learnt from the application of a gendered
perspective, a range of policy directives are expected to manifest.
4. In conclusion, research findings and future scenarios will be summarised.
8
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in its current form, originated in the
Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebel onslaughts in Eastern Congo on the 2nd of August
1998. Within a month a further five African states and more than a dozen rebel groups were
drawn into the conflict, earning it the genus of Africa's first world war'. Since the start of the
conflict it is estimated that nearly three million lives have been 10st4, nearly half the
population left malnourished, two million internally displaced and a further 300 000 forced to
seek refugee status in neighbouring countries (UN OCHA, 2002).
Although a number of recent events, starting with the death of Laurent Kabila and the
accession of his son, Joseph Kabila, have brought about a number of positive developments,
the simmering conflict in the DRC continues to pose some real threats to the success of the
newly created African Union and also threatens the realisation of Mbeki's African
Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).
The aim of this section is to provide a broad overview of the most salient aspects of the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to be able to appraise conflict
resolution efforts since the beginning of the current conflict.
By means of an introduction, the first sub-section will comprise a brief overview of the
conflict in the DRC positioning it as an ethnic or identity conflict. However, it is
characterised by particularities such as the unprecedented involvement of multiple and varied
external forces, coupled with the geopolitical and historical contexts. The following section
3 A phrase ascribed to former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright.
4 At the end of 2001 the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that over two and half
million people had died since August 1998 in eastern DRC, largely as a result of economic insecurity (Institute for
Security Studies, 2002a). It is projected that this figure had reached nearly three million by the end of 2002.
9
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will be dedicated to the chronological 'mapping' of conflict resolution processes and an
attempt will be made to integrate practice and theory in preparation for the final section,
which will identify some of the challenges associated with the past peace processes and
outline some future scenarios/prospects.
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Map 1: The Democratic Republic of the Congo
2.2 UNDERSTANDING THE CONGO ANDPLACING THE SECOND
REBELLION IN PERSPECTIVE
Roughly double the size of South Africa and similar in size to Western Europe, the Congo is
probably the most difficult country in Africa for outsiders to comprehend. Its population
10
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(49,8 million according to 1999 World Bank estimates) is very diverse in ethnic terms with
sharp regional differences. The DRC shares common borders with no less than nine other
African states and its range of precious raw materials makes it highly attractive to many of
the large corporations of the developed world - and as will soon be elucidated, so too for
private interests in the guise of state action (Institute For Security Studies, 2001).
Emerging from a tumultuous colonial past, which was defined by the ruthless practices of
Belgian King Leopold II, Zaire fell prey to the autocratic and self-indulgent rule of Mobuto
Sese Seko. When his corrupt military regime was overthrown by rebel forces led by Laurent
Desiree Kabila and the country renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, hopes
were high that the military will stand back to allow the democratic elections, promised by
Kabila in his accession to power, to take place. Hopes of peace in a democratic society were
soon dashed. Kabila's promises of political and social reform failed to realise. Instead he
clamped down on political rights, banned all political activities and failed to install an
efficient administration. Kabila's reluctance to honour his promise became a primary cause of
the war. Furthermore, the alienation of his minority countrymen resulted in the estrangement
of erstwhile supporters, Uganda and Rwanda, who now became his most powerful
adversaries (Hartley, 1998 & Qwelane, 1999). The military remained in power and it remains
to be seen whether Joseph Kabila will make good his father's original promises under more
stable internal conditions in the future.
State failure and the inability to provide security and protection for its citizenry stands at the
heart of the continuation of the conflict. Warring (internal) parties have, in many instances,
become so immersed in the conflict that major adjustments need to be made before the costs
of continuing conflict would exceed those of negotiation or surrender. Former fighters also
have little prospect of the opportunity to realise their 'normal' potential in a war-tom country
where socio-economic and infrastructural development was placed on the backburner while
Government treasuries were exhausted to support and sustain the Sese Seko and then Kabila
regimes.
In the aftermath of the conflict it is not only the Congolese who will pay the price, but also
the citizens within other states who disregarded international outcries to withdraw their forces
from the Congo and allow the internal process of reconstruction to proceed unfettered.
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2.3 THE SECOND REBELLION: PARTIES, ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The current bout of conflict in the DRC started with Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels
taking up arms against Kabila (senior) on the 2nd of August 1998. They quickly made major
gains all over the country, also capturing the Inga dam that supplies Kinshasa with electricity
(Saturday Argus, 1999). Within two weeks of the first attacks, Zimbabwe and Namibia, under
the guise of the Southern African Development Community Organ for Politics, Defence and
Security (SADC OPDS) sent troops to assist Kabila. Angola joined forces on the 24th of
August and Kabila's troops managed to recapture Inga dam and clamp down on the rebel
threat in the West. By the end of August the UN responded with calls for a cease-fire and the
withdrawal of all foreign forces in the Congo. Meanwhile the Rassemblement Congolais pour
la demoeratie (RCD) consolidated their gains in the east of the country (Saturday Argus,
1999). The expeditious escalation of the conflict was further helped along by Chad's
deployment of troops into northern Congo.
2.3.1 PARTIES
As an internal war with external intervention, the war in the DRC highlights the fallacy of the
common conjecture that inter-state wars are being replaced by intra-state wars in the post-
Cold War era (Solomon, 2000b as cited in Van Schalkwyk, 2001a). It serves as a reminder of
how goal incompatibility extends across artificial boundaries and, at the same time, of the
importance of external support for successful internal insurrection (Van Schalkwyk, 2001b).
At the height of the conflict the Congolese Government forces were thus supported by five
states in the region: Angola, Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe and Sudan. The Mouvement pour la
liberation du Congo (MLC), led by Jean Pierre Bemba, enjoyed the support of Uganda, while
the RCD-GOMA (RCD) and RCD-Kisangani were backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
respectively. The involvement of states on all sides was officially legitimated by security
concerns, but in actual fact it would appear that it was only Namibia that was truly motivated
as such. Chad and Sudan soon withdrew from the conflict and the prolonged involvement of
Rwanda, Angola and Zimbabwe has frequently been ascribed to their commercial interests
within the resource-rich DRC (Braeckman, 2001).
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Other major non-statutory/rebel forces in the Great Lakes region (and active in the Congo)
include the Interahamwe (Hutu militias), Armée du Libération du Rwanda (AliR), former
Farces Armee Rwandaise (ex-FAR), Mayi-Mayi", Farces pour la defense de la demoeratie
(FDD), Ngilima, Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). The
Union pour la demoeratie et le progress social (UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi is the major
grouping representing the unarmed opposition in the DRC. (See Appendix B for a more
complete list of parties involved in the DRC war.)
2.3.2 ISSUES
The question of the Banyamulenge (ethnic Rwandese Tutsis living in the Kivus) remains
central and partially explains the involvement of at least some of the external forces in the
DRC domestic war (Kabemba, 1999). Formally brokered peace agreements may provide
temporary reprieve, but for Tutsis - the principal targets of the 1994 genocide - their very
survival as a people is at stake. "A way must be found to convince Tutsis that the vast expanse
of forests and mountains of Congo will not and cannot be used as a base for those
(Interahamwe) who want to exterminate them ... until the Tutsis believe that they are safe
there will be no peace in the Congo" (Wende, 2001).
Although the war has domestic roots, it has an even stronger regional character. Foreign
powers are seeking access to the mineral riches of the DRC6 and control of the territory to
prevent rebel movements from attacking across national borders from bases in the DRC - an
issue of national security for Rwanda and Uganda. Braeckman (2001) claims that Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi, the main 'defenders' of the rebel/Tutsi cause and their own borders, are
also deliberately fuelling ethnic rivalries in order to justify their de facto annexation of the
mineral rich northern and northeastern parts of the Congo. As Deodatte (2002a: 3) puts the
5 A local (Congolese) militia group opposed to the Banyamulenge, a group of Congolese nationals who are ethnic
Rwandese
6 In 2000 the UN Security Council mandated a panel of experts to investigate the "Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The panel's report was
published on 21 October 2002.
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general ethos among Congolese people, "the wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo
explains this unrestrained desire that our rich and beautiful country undergoes from its
neighbours H. The return of peace and stability to the region will also harm commercial
interests of Rwanda based on customs free Congolese exports currently channelled through
Rwanda to Europe and the US. In fact, Braeckman (2001) goes as far as to argue that the
security situation in Kivu province served as a pretext for the war from the outset.
These factors and issues indicate "wars within the war"? and hint at the complexity of any
conflict resolution efforts in the DRC. Because of the varied and persistent attacks on its
sovereignty and legitimacy, state power held by the DRC Government has decreased to levels
indicative of state collapse. The protracted and intense conflicts - spread over just about the
entire territory - have also brought to an effective halt the delivery of most basic services, the
maintenance of infrastructure and the collection of Government revenue. Whether this
situation could have been averted by the timely implementation of democratic reforms by
Laurent Kabila is questionable (and unlikely). But it is certain that the accomplishment of
economic liberalisation and opening of the market as envisioned by Joseph Kabila will be
hampered by the deficits of the past - remote and recent (Braeckman, 2001).
Through the prolonged duration of the conflict, leaders like Mugabe and Museveni find the
stability of their own regimes wrapped up in the Congo war. The real fear is that the fight
inside the Congo will become a fight for the Congo, a struggle to carve up the nation and
assign new borders. In Michaels (1999), John Peleman, director of Belgian-based
International Peace Information Service, warns that players become increasingly politically
and economically involved in the territory they are occupying as the conflict drags on. This
hypothesis has been borne out in the case of the eastern part of the Congo where the de facto
annexation by Rwanda has in some places resulted in take-over of administrative functions
such as vehicle licensing, telephone services, and so forth (Rose Mpisi, personal
communication, 24 September 2001).
7 To name but a few, there have been reports of armed clashes between Uganda and Rwanda armies; the
government of Sudan and various armed groups; the government of Angola and UNITA, the government of
Uganda and the Mayi-Mayi; the government of Burundi and the FDD; and the FLC and Mayi-Mayi (Banda
Mbombo & Hemedi Bayoio, 2002).
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2.4 CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES - NEGOTIATION AND
BARGAINING8
In an internal conflict such as that in the DRC, the logic of the zero-sum outcome is
inconceivable. Instead, outcomes should be perceived in terms of a positive sum (rather than
merely non-zero sum), where all parties can benefit from the agreement reached. This
necessitates broad and inclusive participation from the earliest stages of the process.
According to Mark Malan (2000), "[t]he present conflict in the DRC spawned a variety of
incoherent 'peacemaking' responses at different levels of the layered response hierarchy.
These have included armed intervention by neighbouring states on both sides of the conflict,
and a host of diplomatic efforts by SADC member states and a plethora of other actors.
Indeed, military hostilities had hardly commenced on 2 August 1998 before the first of a
number of increasingly complicated responses to the conflict occurred". The intervention by
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia claimed legitimacy as an exercise in regional conflict
resolution although it was never officially endorsed by Heads of State and Government
within SADC who favoured a path of peacemaking (as opposed to peace enforcement'').
2.4.1 THE LUSAKA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT
A meeting of regional leaders, held in Pretoria on 17 June 1999, brought together leaders
from the fourteen SADC member countries, as well as Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and Kenya,
and paved the way for a DRC summit with the purpose of signing a cease-fire agreement.
Following several delays and troubled pre-negotiations, a Ceasefire Agreement was signed by
the six African states involved in the war. However, the Congolese rebel groups refused to
sign because they were excluded from the ceasefire negotiations (Masire, 2001 & Malan,
8 A more complete timeline of conflict resolution efforts is contained in Appendix C. This section will briefly
review the most significant and prolific proceedings.
9 Within UN parlance, peacemaking refers to the non-violent efforts at resolving a conflict. This includes
negotiation and arbitration. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, would involve the employment of troops in
order to force parties towards the cessation of hostilities.
15
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2000). The MLC agreed to sign the Lusaka peace deal only six weeks later and the leadership
struggle within the RCD further retarded the process until the 31 st of August 1999. The main
provisions of the Lusaka agreement are contained in Appendix D.
Efforts to get the process going were thwarted, slowing down progress towards an inter-
Congolese dialogue. Although there was a ceasefire in place, countless violations persisted
from all sides. Meetings to stop the fighting and implement the agreement came to naught.
The result was that the conditions stipulated by the UN for a realistic deployment of the UN
Peacekeeping Mission were not met. There were intensified demands for changes to the
Lusaka Agreement, in particular from the side of the non-signatories and the Government,
threatening the basis of the peace process. The DRC remained mired in civil war and a
deepening humanitarian crisis (Mas ire, 2001, Van der Bij, 2000, Saturday Argus, 1999 &
Malan, 2000).
The impasse in the peace process since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement appears to have
been brought to an end by the death of Laurent Kabila in January 2001. His departure
presented an adjustment of the equation in the DRC, which had previously been tilted heavily
against a peaceful, political solution to the protracted conflict. According to Shannon Field
(2000), his son and successor, Joseph Kabila " ... has committed himself to the implementation
of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, cooperating with the UN and MONUe, and forging ahead
with the internal dialogue".
The current DRC Government, other signatories and outside commentators have
understandably expressed reservations about aspects of the Lusaka Agreement. Some feel that
it is principally a ceasefire agreement, with the democratisation process purely an appendix.
Others maintain that the agreement gives too much say to foreigners on how the peace
process should proceed and how the DRC should ultimately be administrated. Some believe
that the exclusion of civil society and the opposition from the agreement is a weakness. The
omission of reparations to the victims of war from the agreement is also regarded as
unacceptable by some.
Sir Ketumile Masire, former Botswana President and official facilitator contended, however,
that the Lusaka Agreement has its strengths, and it has indeed formed the foundation of
further attempts at restoring peace and order to the DRC.
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2.4.2 THE MISSION DE L 'OBSERVATION DES NATIONS AU CONGOIMONUC
"Although very much a 'home-grown' agreement and the product of a regional peacemaking
process, the Lusaka cease-fire accord did place a heavy burden of expectancy on a UN
peacekeeping force" (Masire, 2001). In March 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
voiced hopes that the Security Council will send peacekeepers to the DRC. Subsequently the
UN Security Council passed a resolution for the deployment of 500 observers and 5,000
troops in the Congo in January 2000 (Mills, 2002).
Strident calls by African leaders for the deployment of a 'full-fledged UN peacekeeping
mission' was met with caution and delays. Annan's announcement that Chapter VII of the
UN Charter would not be invoked further depressed these high demands. A major reason for
this being the seeming inability of the UN to secure troops to allow it to exercise coercive
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups that would have been
required (Malan, 2000).
The UN finally started the deployment of troops and observers in March 2001, and the
deployment has been in force since April 2001. Security Council Resolution 1355, passed on
15 June 2001 extended the mandate of MONUC until 15 June 2002, and on 14 June 2002
Resolution 1417 further extended MONUC's mandate until30 June 2003 with a commitment
to review progress every four months on the basis of reports of the Secretary General (Annan,
2002a). MONUC's activities in the DRC are structured into three phases - MONUC I, II and
III (see Appendix E for more details of the MONUC force and its mandate). On 4 December
2002 the UN Security Council passed resolution 1445, enlarging the strength of MONUC to
8,700, specifically requesting the UN Secretary General to place more MONUC resources in
the Ituri region 10 (IRINNews, 2002).
10 The Ituri district of Orientale Province, bordering Uganda, is one of eastern ORe's least stable and most
conflict-affected areas. It sees the Union des patriots congo/ais (Upe), who are in control of the regional capital
Bunia, pitted against the UPDF, ReD-N, ReD-K-ML and various other forces. According to an IRIN report
(IRINNews, December 2002), the tensions in Ituri result from several factors, including historical landownership
and tension between the Hema and Lendu communities, and have been fanned by military, commercial and
political forces. The humanitarian situation in Ituri is dismal with aid workers facing various obstacles and
security threats (sometimes directly targeted) in the execution of their tasks.
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Lacking powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and despite recommendations from the
UN Secretary General, new MONUC troops would be deployed to Kindu and Kisangani,
instead of lturi. Troop deployment in support of the DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation,
Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration) programme is mainly intended for the foreign
armed groups and does not as such make provision for addressing the situation in lturi (where
local groups are at odds).
Following the 17 December Pretoria Agreement (discussed later on under paragraph 2.4.6)
which provides for a transitional period and the formation of various state institutions, Amos
Namanga Ngongi, head of MONUC, called for a new mandate for the mission to be support
the state-building exercise in the country.
2.4.3 THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE
After much delay and a few false starts, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (lCD) finally got
underway at Sun City, South Africa on the zs" of February 2002 with more than 300
participants from different parties, movements, groups and organisations from the DRC.
During seven weeks of negotiations delegates reached agreements on the integration of the
opposing armed forces, the economic reconstruction of the country, national reconciliation
and a humanitarian assistance programme. However, an agreement on an all-inclusive
transitional Government remained elusive.
Outside the framework of the lCD, a partial agreement was reached on 19 April 2002
between Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC and the DRC Government. The agreement, labelled the
political agreement on consensual management of the transition in the DRC (PACMT),
consolidated power sharing between the signatories but excluded major political players.
Subsequently Ketumile Masire called for a continuation of the lCD in a reduced form
(Naidoo, 2002).
A commitment to install a transition Government in Kinshasa on 15 June and the
commitment for continued negotiations with the RCD and Rwanda, bode well for sustainable
peace in the DRC. President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa received a mandate to lead the
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process. South Africa's apparent support for the RCD (now in an alliance with the UDPS) at
Sun City however, brought into question its neutrality.
An apparent step on the way to regional peace and security, the lCD provided a framework
for power sharing in the Congo while putting the issue of Rwanda's security on the table. It
also opened the door for discussion of the reconstruction of the Congolese state.
2.4.5 PRETORIA AND LUANDA
The Pretoria Agreement, between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, was signed in
Pretoria on the 30th of July 2002. It makes provision for the complete withdrawal of Rwandan
forces from the DRC on the condition that Kinshasa rounds up the Interahamwe11 and ex-Far
militias operating in the east of the country, safeguarding the Rwandan border. The
Agreement provides for a verification mechanism to be administered by South Africa and
MONUC (see Appendix F for the provisions of the Agreement). Although the agreement was
widely hailed as a watershed, analysts were quick to point out the difficulties that may be
encountered in meeting unrealistic deadlines and the failure of the agreement to address some
of the issues associated with the large-scale withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the areas
under their control (Malan & Boshoff, 2002). A well-publicised withdrawal of Rwandan
forces under the watchful eye of MONUC resulted in the departure of 23,400 RPA forces -
verified by the Third party Verification Mechanism on 24 October 2002.
Under the auspices of the Angolan Government, the DRC and Uganda entered into a wide-
ranging agreement in September 2002. Recognising the volatile situation in Ituri as in need of
special attention before pullout, Uganda committed itself to withdrawing its troops
completely from the DRC by the end of 2002, leaving only some border patrols. The Luanda
Agreement made provision for the establishment of an lturi Pacification Committee (IPC)12
11 Rwandan Hutu extremist militias
12 The IPC provides for representatives of parties, political, military, economic and social forces and local
communities in the Ituri district of Orientale Province, to get together to make peace in the region, with support
from MONUC.
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to pave the way for the Ugandan pullout. Deadlines regarding the establishment of
Kinshasa's control over the lturi region and the Ugandan pullout have been missed, and the
ICP's structure, composition, programme of work and leadership remain unresolved.
Regional analysts fear that the withdrawal of Ugandan forces could lead to a power vacuum
which would result in an upsurge m conflict with parties excluded from the Pretoria
agreement scrambling for territory to secure concessions in future negotiations. Both
Kinshasa and the UN have, however, since the signing of the agreement, asked Uganda to
watch out for the civilian population in and around Bunia and avoid a premature departure
(IRINNews, 2002). Meanwhile, allegations of Uganda's commercial interest in the DRC
continue to abound and officers have been accused of deliberately fuelling the crisis in order
to justify its continued presence in the region (IRINNews, 2002).
2.4.6 PRETORIA II
Preliminary consultations on a global and inclusive agreement ended on 4 November 2002.
On 9 December stakeholders were reconvened, and on 17 December 2002 an agreement was
signed in Pretoria - the culmination of three years of peacemaking efforts, the lCD and
follow-up talks mediated by the UN and South Africa. Itmakes provision for power-sharing
arrangements that determine the composition of the transitional Government and sets out
preparations for multi-party elections that are scheduled to take place in two years' time.
Under this deal, Joseph Kabila will stay on in his post for two years, while the rebel forces
and the political opposition will be given Government portfolios, including three of the four
vice presidential positions.
Although Pretoria II signals an official cessation of hostilities, many challenges remain on the
road to peace. The transitional Government will have to deal with ongoing conflicts such as
those plaguing the lturi region. "The UPC [Union des patriots congolais ] which holds Bunia
and some surrounding towns, was not among the rebel groups which signed the Pretoria
agreement. Lubanga's earlier requests for a seat at the table were declined, a diplomat
familiar with the process told IRIN. 'It will be up to the Congolese to sort out the mess, ' the
diplomat said." (IRINNews, 2002)
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2.5 CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PEACE PROCESS
The peace process in the DRC has been fraught with a number of difficulties. Apart from the
lack of willingness from the side of the previous Kabila Government to accept the external
efforts to ameliorate the situation in the Congo, frequent violations of ceasefire agreements
from both sides and insufficient resources on the side of MONDC never bode well for lasting
peace.
A theoretical challenge posed by the situation in the DRC is the need for a comprehensive
framework relating to the abundance, rather than the scarcity of resources. The DRC conflict
indicates that competition over resources have more dimensions than those studied by
Homer-Dixon (1991 & 1993) and his ilk. The DRC's domestic situation with regard to
control and power is reminiscent of the images conjured of the anarchical system by many
theorists of international relations where self-help becomes the guiding principle of forces of
varied might. While the main responsibility for agreeing on acceptable formulae for the
sharing of the DRC's resources rests on the shoulders of internal powers, the international
community has to accept its shared responsibility and take appropriate steps to effect
measures that will bring to justice those forces who have been involved in the illegal
exploitation of the natural wealth of the Congo and the prolonging of the conflict.
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CHAPTER 3: GENDERING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
3.1. INTRODUCTION
There is a considerable and growing body of literature on feminism/gender theory, conflict
and conflict management/resolution, and peace studies. Theorists and practitioners have been
looking at the role of women in conflict and conflict management and have also looked at
how the experience of, and principles entrenched in gender theory is a rich resource for
conflict resolution.
The idea of gendering is born of the feminist claim that the codification of social scientific
knowledge has excluded women (and their experiences) to the extent that existing knowledge
claims about human experience may be called 'man's/androcentric knowledge' and as such
does not take cognisance of the true complexities of social existence (Peterson, 1992: 6).
Gendering thus refers to a process of epistemological revision. Such a process takes place on
a theoretical and intellectual level, but the revisions and contributions that translate into new
frameworks of knowledge and understanding are not born purely out of philosophical
meandering divorced from social reality. Instead, it refers to the revision also of the
ontological, based on experiences of, and interpretations by, specific groups within specific
social and historical contexts.
3.2 A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY
Following the end of the Cold War the focus of analysts shifted towards protracted conflicts
that have become largely internal and relatively devoid of external intervention. But such a
generalisation does not do justice to the complexity of conflicts currently ravaging African
soil. Traditional conceptions of conflict based on the centrality of states as actors and rational
choices based on strategic thinking need to be supplemented by more sensitive and particular
approaches to the understanding and analysis of modem day conflicts. In situations such as
that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where battles are of a lower intensity and
much longer duration than traditionally, the rules of war are of little relevance. Military
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technology and superiority no longer assures victory in battles waged on the psychological
level as much as on the ground. Furthermore, the state as belligerent cannot rely on excessive
force harnessed by such instruments as nuclear power and massive military deployment as
leverage against enemies who are often child soldiers, women and small bands of career
rebels inspired by desperation! destitution and led by warlord-like leadership (Van Creveld,
1991: Chapter 1-2, Monroe, 2001 & Tomlinson, 1998).
The war in the Congo provides a striking example of some of the complexities with which
scholars and theorists have to contend. Situated in a less developed region where poverty and
basic human insecurities threaten the existence of citizens even in the absence of actual
violent conflict. Regular armies - as conceived and developed within the Western European
state system - are often absent, as are sophisticated technologies and the formulation of
effective strategy. But the battle itself is every bit as bloody as ever with civilians being
rendered legitimate targets of political violence. In protracted, low-intensity conflicts such as
in the DRC, identities are formed around rebel or victim status, and the process of
implementing and maintaining the peace once it has been brokered amongst elites, is often
the most daunting challenge. The conflict is further imbued with particular political
significance in a very localised and often individual sense. Such a war is total and the
traditional boundaries between soldier and citizen, 'public' and 'private' no longer serves as
protection from injury and loss of life (Van Creveld, 1991). To further complicate matters,
the colonial era and the Cold War have left a legacy of the 'right to revolt', an abundance of
freely available small arms and armed civilians, ineffective and unresponsive governance
structures, and pronounced ethnic divisions.
Realist and Liberal-Democratic solutions elaborated within the western context certainly have
relevance to conflict resolution processes in such cases. However, the uncritical, inflexible
application of explanatory frameworks and supposedly fitting solutions often lead to
outcomes plagued by spoilers, post-settlement violence and a deepening of societal
cleavages. To arrive at lasting resolutions of violent conflict and establish effective
management of regular societal conflict through appropriate institutions it is thus necessary to
engage in sensitive and thorough investigation of:
• the root structural and superficial 'trigger' causes of conflicts;
• the ever-changing dynamics of the actual conflict situations; and
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• the nature and motives of the parties involved (as well as, often, the precise definition of
the many belligerents in such conflict situations).
This needs to take place within a historical and geopolitical framework that takes into
consideration not only the past, but also the present and immediate future in structural and
systemic terms. As a final caution it should be noted that a total rejection of traditional
approaches and understandings might be as perilous as being unquestioningly wedded to
them. Developing regions often display a disjointed array of traditional and modem, western
and non-western approaches. Treating such regions in isolation of the global political
economy would also be naïve and counterproductive and critical intellectual revisions and
practical conflict resolution processes need to be grounded within the greater global
community.
3.3 GENDER THEORY
Obviously the popular image offeminism 's role in society and feminism 's own
self-image are at odds. Moreover, the current popular association of
feminism with gender-bashing, and less radical forms of gender conflict, is
particularly ironic in light of feminism 's long association with pacifism, and
less radical forms of peacemaking. Feminists from the nineteenth century
forward have asserted that when women attain full and equal participation in
society they will make a distinctive and vital contribution to conflict
resolution and apeaceful social order (Berg, 1994: 6)
While this romanticised notion of the potential feminist contribution to conflict resolution
has obvious appeal, I favour a gendered approach as it overcomes some of the limitations
and dangers inherent in stereotyped perspectives about women and peace as well as gender-
blind analyses.
While the different feminist schools broadly and incompletely categorised as liberal
feminism, difference feminism and post-modem feminism all provide partial explanations for
gendered war roles, at least two of these unquestioningly accept male and female stereotypes
as part of their premises for the broader participation of women in society. Liberal feminists
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reject the female stereotype and argue for women's inclusion into positions of power and
decision-making based on their equality in ability. They do not believe that the inclusion of
women would fundamentally change the international system or war itself and reject the idea
that women are more peaceful than men by nature (Goldstein, 2002). In contrast, difference
feminists "believe that women's experiences are fundamentally different from men's. In this
view, the problem is not that men and women are different but that sexist cultures devalue
"feminine" qualities instead of valuing, celebrating, and promoting them. Regarding war,
difference feminists argue that women, because of their greater experience with nurturing
and human relations, are generally more effective than men in conflict resolution and group
decision-making, and less effective than men in combat ...Thus, according to difference
feminism, women have unique abilities as peacemakers ...Some difference feminists see such
gender differences as biologically based, whereas others see them as entirely cultural, but
they agree that gender differences are real, and not all bad" (Goldstein, 2002: 41). This has
led to accusations of essentialism, which serve to reinforce the gendered stereotypes that
underpin women's oppression. Others who take a less biological deterministic position see
women's values as learned skills and argue that men too, can learn to nurture.
Post-modern feminist theory provides an aperture into a gendered perspective in that it rejects
both male and female stereotypes. "Post-modern feminism questions the assumptions about
gender made by both liberal and difference feminists. Rather than take gender as two
categories of people that really exist ...post-modern feminists see gender itself, and gender
roles in war, as fairly fluid, contextual and arbitrary. Gender shapes how both men and
women understand their experiences and actions in regard to war. Therefore gender is
everywhere, and some scholars reveal and deconstruct the implicitly gender-laden
conceptualframeworks of both theorists and practitioners of war" (Goldstein, 2002: 49)
A gender perspective based on post-modern feminism allows for the bridging of some of the
differences in feminist schools, and finds meaning in its application to a practical situation. It
does argue for the equality of opportunity for women and the inclusion of women into
positions of power, it argues for the participation of women in peacemaking and it argues for
a more peaceful social order based on egalitarianism. But it does not do so based on
essentialist claims related to specific qualities possessed by women (or men for that matter).
Instead, a gender perspective looks at the socially constructed and maintained roles assumed
by both men and women in time and space with equal importance. As such, a gendered
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approach implies an investigation of the stereotyped roles of both men and women within the
conflict, and conflict resolution processes, and ways of overcoming these stereotypes through
practical actions in order to produce a more egalitarian society wherein power relations are
fundamentally (and structurally) altered and prospects for sustainable peace are substantially
improved.
Inevitably a gendered approach in this instance will focus on women more than men. This is
not because women are more important than men, but because women and their experiences
have, through history, categorically been excluded from discourse and theory, for no reason
other than that they are women. But women and their experiences are not to be treated as a
homogeneous group, obscuring the diversity of identities and the extended range of
experiences and meanings available not only to men, but also to women.
3.4 A GENDER PERSPECTIVE FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
According to Christene Sylvester (1991), 'war and peace' is one of the International
Relations topics that have elicited most interest by gender-aware researchers across the
spectrum of empiricist, standpoint, and post-modem feminism. This interest has certainly
grown over the past decade as violent conflicts have proliferated, protracted conflicts
remained unresolved and the peaceful, egalitarian world order failed to emerge out of the
ashes. For reasons that should become self-evident in the ensuing analysis, a gendered
perspective on conflict, peace and security implies a shift in focus from conflict resolution to
conflict management.
Conflict is defined by Bercovitch (1984: 125) as "a perception of incompatibility between
two or more actors and the range of behaviour associated with such perceptions ". He
continues to emphasise that conflict thus abounds in all social systems and various levels and
require resolution or management. Conflict resolution refers to the long-term proposition
whereby the causes as well as the manifestations of a conflict between parties are removed
and sources of incompatibility in their positions are eliminated (Zartman & Rasmussen,
1997:11). Accepting that conflict is an integral and inevitable part of all social relations -
under certain conditions a positive force - conflict management then rather refers to
eliminating the violent and violence-related means of pursuing the conflict, leaving it to be
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worked out on a purely political level. Such an approach implies a much more realistic and
achievable goal - that of re-channelling conflict through institutional arrangements such as
regular elections or recourse to arbitration. A related concept is that of conflict transformation
which means replacing conflict with positive relationships, such as satisfaction, cooperation,
empathy and interdependence between parties. Accordingly, this shift in emphasis provides
for a view of bringing an end to violent expressions of conflict (i.e., war) not as an event, but
as a process that opens up a space for the timely and continuous consideration of post-war
reconstruction imperatives.
To apply a gender perspective to conflict management is to recognize that women and men
are differently (but not uniformly so) involved in and affected by armed conflicts. As Dalak
(2002) puts it: " ...women are often targets and victims of violence in war perpetuated by
men". While numerous instances of women as instigators and reproducers of violent conflict
have been cited, generally speaking, women as civilians are more likely to be killed than
soldiers during armed conflicts in which they are not actively taking part. Women and girls
furthermore face the risks of being raped and sexually assaulted or abused. In addition,
women are often hardest hit by the trauma of losing relatives and of having to take the
responsibility for the care of surviving family members in societies that are more often than
not hostile and discriminatory in their treatment of women as economic and political actors.
Because of the brutal interplay of these factors, women also constitute the majority of
refugees and displaced persons (Dalak, 2002).
Women should not, however, be viewed primarily as the victims of armed conflict. Their
potential as agents of preventive diplomacy, peace-building and conflict resolution deserves
recognition. Their primary tasks at grassroots level - through practical tasks such as trauma
therapy, information and advocacy, and alternative income-generating activities - allow them
to create and sustain dialogue between conflicting groups, and building constituencies of
peace. "Nonetheless, politicians, policy makers, and practitioners have assumed that
questions of gender were not relevant to this area of policy. Thus women are generally absent
from official initiatives (track 1) to end conflicts dominated by military men and their voices
are missing from decisions on priorities in the peace processes" (Dalak, 2002). Because of
this persistent exclusion of women from formal peace negotiations, peace-building and post-
conflict reconstruction processes, the skills, confidence and knowledge-resources remain an
undervalued and untapped resource.
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Important to remember, at this point, is that a gender perspective does not support stereotypes
of women as peace-builders based on their supposed 'natural' capacities and assumed
biological traits. Instead, their strength as peace-builders derive from certain experiences
within specific and bound contexts, just as their ability to participate is circumscribed by
space and time. Neither of these situations thus constitutes inflexible and universal truths and
human agency is recognised as an important ingredient in creating, recreating, mediating and
contesting gendered identities. A gendered perspective of post-war reconstruction recognises
the potential for change and/or conflict that is created where social relations tend to be in
enormous flux. Radically new sets of experiences allow some actors to attempt to introduce
new ways of being while others attempt to retain the status quo.
3.5 GENDERING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DRC
Louise Vincent (2001) argues that, from a gendered perspective, it is important to consider
pre-war experiences, as they will affect the way that gendered roles are reconfigured in the
post-war period. The structural and situational factors that are present in a society
characterised by gender inequality and discrimination, wherein women are excluded and
disadvantaged for no other reason than that they are women, the social significance of
women's experiences in post-war situations allows for some generalisation. "So, for example,
to say that someone is a "widow" has social, economic and political implications and
resonances which are not present if one refers in gender-neutral terms to "someone who has
lost a spouse ". But these resonances only exist because of a prior set of social structures
which are gendered" (Vincent, 2001). Equally significant is the fact that these factors also
playa decisive role in defining the motivations as well as the constraints on women's
involvement as social actors in the political process towards sustainable peace (Sorenson as
cited in Vincent, 2001).
In this section, the propositions of a gendered perspective are applied to the situation in the
DRC consistent with Vincent's assertions (Vincent, 2001). Most importantly - applying such
a gender perspective highlights how, and why women contribute to the reproduction of
relations of dominance and militarised attitudes in the Congo, rather than challenging them.
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"Some commentators have seen this gendered role definition as having the
potential to place significant power in women's hands. In war-torn societies,
education is often regarded as an important agent of socialisation in
alternative norms to prevailing attitudes of hostility. There are many
examples of women's self-help groups (in Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda and
elsewhere) that focus on trying to increase women's awareness of their
indirect roles in conflict through their primary responsibility for socialisation
of children and of the possibilities for change. Such programmes however are
premised on the idea that the disempowered are through their very
disempowerment able to challenge social structures. They take as given
women's predominance in certain social roles and responsibilities and fail to
challenge some of the bases for war and violence in relations of gender
domination which alienate men from children, result in an absence of
positive male role models performing functions of caring and nurturing, deny
women access to power or authority, marginalise attitudes of peaceableness
and valorise violence. Under these structural conditions women are far more
likely to fulfil their socialised "responsibility" of reproducing relations of
dominance and militarised attitudes than they are to challenge them" (Louise
Vincent,2001).
3.5.1 THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN THE DRC
The ragmg war has taken its toll on the general Congolese population in the country.
Womenl3 are the most vulnerable group in the war context. Internal displacement, losses of
property, malnutrition, high mortality levels, and hard labour tasks for survival, prostitution
and poor health facilities have increased. Rape is used as a weapon against women, and
HIV/AIDS also presents a major threat to women's health and well-being.
3.5.1.1 WOMEN'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATUS IN CONGOLESE SOCIETY
The Congolese society is patriarchal. Patriarchal practices are entrenched in the local culture
and women's rights are not acknowledged or recognized. Women's political participation is
limited and their point of view is neither sought for, nor considered. "There is no clear
provision for women toparticipate inpolitics and women themselves are not demanding for it
13Women make up 46 percent of the Congolese population
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[sic]" (Deodatte, 2002b: 9). But to merely assert that Congolese women do not desire
political participation is to be ignorant of some stark facts. In the DRC, " ...women are
forbidden to make any kind of demonstration to assert their rights" (Deodatte, 2002b: 8 &
Rose Mpisi, personal communication, 24 September 2001 & 14 January 2003).
Women in the DRC enjoy no sexual or reproductive rights in a country where family
planning is considered a taboo - "the value of a woman is measured through the number of
children she has" (Congo Country Report: 5 as cited in Deodatte, 2002a: 4). When parents
separate, women have no access to their children. Furthermore, while adulterous women are
heavily penalised, patriarchal practices neither disapprove of, nor punish men for the same
misdemeanour, putting women at great risk of sexually transmitted diseases such as
HIV/AIDS.
Other manifestations of the patriarchal culture in the Congo include the following:
D Forced widow inheritances, and disinheritance of pregnant girls.
D Unpunished sexual harassment of women in the workplace.
D Women face arbitrary arrests and punishment.
D Women are excluded from succession or heir status, and where they have or
own property, their own heirs remain unknown.
D Women's right to work is also violated. Women are required to provide
husbands' permission letters as a prerequisite for employment. Women
workers furthermore have no social benefits such as housing or medical care.
D The patriarchal culture is enforced through beliefs and attitudes that regard
women as childbearing machines. If a woman does not have children to the
expectations of the husband, he may terminate the marriage contract.
"Under the conflict situation, women in the DRC live in misery and fear, dominated by
insecurity, abductions, rape and forced sexual slavery. Unless peace is obtained in the DRC,
women's lives will continue to the dominated by the above-mentioned evils and other
atrocities, and they cannot begin to enjoy their rights as human beings" (Deodatte, 2002a: 4).
While there is a state structure in charge of women and family affairs at provincial level in
the DRC, its effectiveness is severely curtailed by the conflict, which has rendered many
areas (at times estimated at more than 50% of the territory) under rebel control. According to
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Deodatte (2002b: 9), humanitarian organizations in these areas do not fill the gap and it is
only through NGOs and umbrella groups "that women can be actively involved in promoting
their rights through peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and open dialogue, as well as
through the media and other debates".
3.5.1.2 WOMEN'S WAR EXPERIENCES
The long running conflict in the DRC has taken a severe toll on women.
Although the DRC is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, the Geneva Conventions and the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, women and girls continue to
be targets of sexual violence, rape and other forms of torture. (Sir Ketumile
Masire, UNIFEM, 2001)
A recent report by the US-based Human Rights Watch (2002) documents the increased
suffering of children and women in the Congo in the past four years. The report, titled War
Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo, says rape and
other forms of sexual violence are frequent and sometimes systematic in areas occupied by
the rebels and their allies (Kamuz, 2002). The main perpetrators of sexual violence against
women and girls are soldiers of the Rwandan army, its ally the RCD, as well as armed groups
opposed to them - Congolese Mai Mai rebels and Rwandan and Burundian armed groups (the
FDD and FNL). However, such war crimes have been committed against women and girls
by forces on all sides.
According to the report (Human Rights Watch, 2002), and supported by evidence from other
reports", violence against women has taken the following forms:
14 The Intemational Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, a Canadian NGO, issued a report,
documenting the horrors experienced by women during a three-year period of ongoing war in the DRC, entitled
'Women's Rights Violations During the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo From August 2, 1998 to
September 30,2001". Available at: www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=29301 (UN OCHA Integrated Regional
Information NetworkllRIN, 2002). This report also includes an extensive list of studies that have attempted to
document the experiences of women and girls in the DRC.
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CJ Combatants raped women and girls during military operations to punish the
civilian population for allegedly supporting the "enemy".
CJ In some cases, soldiers and combatants raped women and girls as part of a more
general attack in which they killed and injured civilians and pillaged and
destroyed their property.
CJ Mai-Mai rebels and other armed groups abducted women and girls and forced
them to provide sexual services and domestic labour, sometimes for periods of
more than a year.
CJ Some rapists attacked their victims with extraordinary brutality. In two cases,
assailants inserted firearms into the vaginas of their victims and shot them. In
other cases combatants mutilated the sexual organs of the women with knives or
razor blades. Some attacked girls as young as five and women as old as eighty.
CJ Assailants often attacked women and girls engaged in the usual activities
necessary to the livelihood of their families: cultivating their fields, collecting
firewood, or going to the market. By doing so, the assailants further disrupted the
already precarious economic life of the region.
But the woes of the women of the Congo do not end here. Other major threats are posed by
the collapse of health services and other infra-structural facilities, notably educational
institutions and the intransigence of traditional customs. In eastern Congo, less than 25% of
the population has access to health services, while the financial crisis in the country renders
the small number of health services and scarce medicines available unaffordable to the
afflicted population. This leaves most victims of rape and other sexual torture with little hope
for treatment of injuries and sexually transmitted diseases. With estimates of HIV/AIDS
prevalence amongst military forces at above 50%, rape can in these circumstances be a death
sentence.
The report also documents the rejection of some women and girls by their husbands, families,
and the wider communities because they were raped or because they are thought to be
infected with HIV/AIDS. As one such ostracized women told Human Rights Watch
researchers, "My body has become sad. I have no happiness" (Human Rights Watch, 2002).
While women do have recourse to the courts, and there have been some convictions, it
remains true that women have little chance of seeing the criminal condemned and hence
seldom bring cases against their rapists. Extreme poverty also forces women, who provide for
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their families, to continue going into the fields to cultivate, to the forest to make charcoal, and
to the market to sell their goods, despite the life-threatening risks they thus incur (Kamuz,
2002).
3.5.2 THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DRC
As always, when the time comes to restore peace and return to normal,
women are marginalized, and even excludedfrom negotiations. And yet there
is nothing utopian about the notion of women as a promoter of peace. The
authors identify the judiciary, medical, psychosocial and institutional
conditions for the "effective participation of women in the peace process"
(Angélique Sita Muila Akele in Banda Mbombo & Hemedi Bayolo, 2002).
While women's organisations and coalitions continued to fight for peace at grassroots level,
their involvement in formal conflict resolution processes remained grossly inadequate, and
gender issues remained off the negotiating table. This section reviews the involvement, and
lack thereof, of Congolese women in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (lCD), also looking at the
various efforts to ensure the equal participation in the process since 2001.
3.5.3 GENDERING CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN THE DRC - THE
lCD
"Without women's ful! participation in the Dialogue, peace will neither be inclusive nor
sustainable" Noeleen Heyzer, UNIFEM's Executive Director (EuropaWorld, 2001).
Following consultation with UNIFEM (the United Nations Development Fund for Women)
and a representative of the SADC's Gender Desk, the office of Sir Ketumile Masire,
facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue released an urgent press statement, urging the
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement to ensure women's equal representation at the
Preparatory Meeting of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. At the time, the DRC's forces vives
(civil society) had designated only one woman to represent them at the preparatory
committee meeting for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to be held in Gaborone, Botswana, from
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20-24 August 2001. Masire's main concern was to address the serious imbalance and ensure
that gender issues are addressed at the Dialogue. Masire further appealed to the UN
Secretary-General and to the Security Council for urgent support in this regard. UNIFEM
Executive Director, Noeleen Heyzer stressed the urgency by noting that this represented the
first real test of the Security Council's watershed resolution 1325 on women and peace and
security (UNIFEM, 2001).
The following actions were proposed (UNIFEM, 2001):
CJ Specialized training for women delegates to the Preparatory Meeting and Dialogue
and capacity building for women's organisations in the DRC.
CJ A substantive item on the agenda of the Dialogue to be discussed at the preparatory
meeting dealing with gender issues, and particularly with respect to the constitution,
the electoral system, the judiciary, the humanitarian and human rights situation of
women and girls, and the threats to peace and security posed by HIV/AIDS.
CJ Closer cooperation with MONUC on the protection of women and girls in the DRC,
their disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation.
In support of these initiatives, the Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), in consultation with the
African Women Committee for Peace and Development (AWCPD), Organisation of African
Unity (OAU) Ambassador Said Djinnit and Masire, organised a Solidarity Mission to the
DRC from 17-23 December 2001 to encourage and support the women of the DRC in their
efforts towards reconciliation and peace in the country. This formed part of a broader two-
year sub-regional program in the Great Lakes region, also including Burundi and Rwanda.
The objectives of the Mission (PeaceWomen, 2001) was to:
CJ Sensitise women leaders of the DRC on the important role they should play in the
peace initiatives for a pacific settlement of the crisis in their country.
CJ Support the women of the DRC to develop a common platform and agenda for peace.
CJ Encourage the co-operation between the women leaders taking part in the lCD.
The Solidarity Mission aimed to support the women in their preparations for effective
participation in the lCD at Sun City, providing training focussed on building the negotiating
skills of the women involved and, finally to support the women for participation in the peace
negotiations themselves. This support took the shape of the creation of a caucus that would
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advocate the women's platform and strengthen partnerships between women and men
involved in the negotiations.
Despite all these efforts and support from the region and international community women
remained a minority in the formal peace talks. Only 5 out of the 74 participants in Botswana
were women. At the preparatory talks in Addis Ababa there were only 7 women amongst the
80 participants, and during the lCD deliberations in Sun City only 24 women were scheduled
to form part of the 330 delegates.
Consequently, another positive development in support of the participation of women in the
lCD took place in Nairobi in mid-February 2002. The Assistant Coordinator of Rights &
Democracy's Women's Rights Programme, Isabelle Solon Helal, met with Congolese women
representatives from civil society, the government, the political opposition and the RCD in a
meeting organized by the Congolese chapter of Women as Partners for Peace in Africa
(WOPPA-DRC). As a result, the participants adopted the Nairobi Declaration (see Appendix
Jl) and a common platform representing the concerns of women from the DRC to be used as
a lobbying tool during the peace negotiations (Libertos, 2002).
In South Africa, the All African Women for Peace (AAWP) organisation played a major part
in the establishment and empowerment of the caucus. Despite severe financial constraints, the
caucus organised non-violent action in support of the women participants at the lCD -
printing T-shirts, pamphlets and posters - and ensuring adequate coverage of their efforts in
the local media (personal communication with Rose Mpisi, Director of AAWP, 14 January
2003).
In the end, more than 60 Congolese women participated in the lCD at Sun City, united to
defend and fight for women's rights in the Congo despite their political differences. Women
from the Women's League of the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party in South
Africa, came out in public support of the women at the lCD on 4 April 2002. The Solidarity
Mission, supported by UNIFEM, urged the Congolese women to fight the system of gender
discrimination and not their male counterparts (Pambazuka, 2002).
But the lCD did not end at Sun City, and neither did the challenges of ensuring the
participation of women in ongoing negotiations. Various organisations continued their efforts
to unite Congolese women and training workshops were held to build women's skills and
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capacity as negotiators. Towards the end of 2002, when the Congolese delegation met again,
this time in Pretoria, for further discussions aimed at reaching an all-inclusive settlement to
the conflict, the women's caucus continued their efforts. More than 50 women were brought
together from 24-29 November 2002 for a workshop funded by UNIFEM and AAWP. Many
participants also paid their own way. Apart from training, women again took part in non-
violent actions to draw attention to their plight. It is not known exactly how many women
actually took part in the negotiations that resulted in the signing of Pretoria II, but the
numbers were far from the 30% target (Rose Mpisi, personal communication, 14 January
2003).
3.6 CONCLUSION
Infusing a gender perspective on conflict management allows for structural obstacles to peace
to be exposed while it also has the ability to create a more accurate objectivity and rationality
for conflict management epistemology. Gender theory acknowledges feminism that, in many
of its manifestations, searches for unifying factors, rather than factors extracted from their
environment and social constructions, allowing for women and men alike to search for
common grounds for peace.
An approach of feminism versus militarism, borne out by gender theory, rejects both
masculine and feminine stereotypes, arguing for a role of feminism in dismantling the
imagery that underlines patriarchy and militarism. This approach charges both men and
women with the responsibility for changing existing structures in which warfare is a central
component and for opening paths to non-violent interaction. While women have no superior
moral claim to being bearers of peace, through their empowerment, they can begin to set
mechanisms of transformation in motion.
Given the effect of conflict on women, it is inevitable that the meaningful management of
conflicts should include a significant role for women. But it is even more important that
rhetorical commitment in this regard be translated into firm action in the area of capacity
building. Within a society where gender is accorded sufficient importance as an analytical
category and where gender equality and non-discrimination become political goals of the
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entire population, violence can be renounced and war as an institution can be replaced by
mechanisms to ensure the safety and security of the people.
The effect of the war on the women of the DRC has been devastating. Regardless, Congolese
women have been the backbone of their society, persevering in their role as nurturers and
peacemakers throughout the difficult periods.
On the other hand, uniting women in peace efforts is not an easy task. The suspicion and
distrust that characterises the Congolese society also affects its women. This is one of the
reasons why external support is of such cardinal importance in supporting the efforts of
women in the Congo to unite and fight for a sustainable peaceful social order based on the
rejection of gender discrimination and all other forms of exclusion. The gains that have been
recorded in ensuring women's participation in peacemaking processes now need to be
consolidated through the sustained support of their efforts from the international community.
Their brothers and sisters on the continent and in the sub-region (SADC) clearly have the
most vital role to play.
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CHAPTER 4: THE WAY FORWARD - GENDERING POST -CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION AND NATION-BUILDING IN THE DRC
In spite offierce resistance by traditionalists (and many modernists too), the
key role of gender in peace-building processes is an important issue. For
example, threats to peace and security tend to remain as long as women
remain marginalised and vulnerable to violence. As a scholar has pointed out,
"women cannot be equated with peace, but there cannot be meaningful peace
in a society which oppresses and excludes women (Van Nieuwkerk, 2000).
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Now that a virtually all-inclusive agreement has been reached, and the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue formally concluded, negotiations and external support will have to continue until
the sensitive matters related to the transitional Government, constitution-writing, military
reform, elections and nationality have been satisfactorily resolved. The disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militias also still pose significant challenges to the
transitional authority.
While these substantive matters are expected to continue enjoying the attention of negotiators
and contenders for political power in the post-war Congolese state, gains can only be
consolidated and sustained in a country where socio-economic problems also receive
sufficient attention. Democratic processes do not guarantee, nor provide, quick fixes to
problems related to delivery and reconstruction. Because it is based on principles of broad
consultation and the protection of and respect for individual human rights, it forecloses
certain avenues. Democratisation is not, however, optional in the current global order. But
along with the demands for responsible and accountable governance, the international society
needs to provide a safety net for post-conflict communities and commit itself to long-term
support of fledgling democracies to prevent a slide back into conflict. Global peace and
welfare needs to be regarded by greater powers in the developing world as a global public
good and the costs of its provision needs to be compared to the costs of its converse - large-
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scale poverty, protracted conflict (with the potential of spilling over into other countries),
refugee crises and debt and other financial defaults.
The following section will focus on the importance of extending a gendered perspective to
post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in the Congo. To this effect, the various
frameworks for guiding and ensuring equal participation of women in society at sub-regional,
regional and international level will be recalled. The purpose of this final chapter is to
propose some options for the pro-active engagement of the international community in the
reconstruction of the DRC and the nurturing of a non-violent, post-patriarchal state where
women take their rightful position in building sustainable peace.
4.2 FRAMEWORKS FOR ACTION
The precarious situation of the women in the DRC, as sketched in the preceding chapters,
makes it clear that they cannot be expected to fend for themselves without any outside
support. The international community has developed a variety of frameworks (at official
level) that aim to elucidate the plight of women in armed conflict and to ensure greater
gender equity and the full participation of women in society. The DRC provides a test case
for many of these frameworks.
4.2.1 INTERNATIONAL - UN
Much progress has been recorded over the last decade in terms of the promulgation of
measures to advance women. The UN has been a driving force behind this progress, adopting
a number of measures aimed at putting "an end to the institutionalised impunity surrounding
such abominable practices, including classifying acts of rape and other forms of sexual
assault, including prostitution, forced pregnancy and sexual slavery as crimes against
humanity when used as part of a systematic and large-scale campaign against a given
population" (Banda Mbombo & Hemedi Bayolo, 2002).
The first major step taken by the international community towards the recognition of
women's special status during and after conflict was the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
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Action (BPFA or PFA, 1995), where women and armed conflict was singled out as one of the
critical areas of concern. Other concerns highlighted in this document, signed by 188
countries, included the inequality observed in economic structures and policies, productive
activities, and access to resources; inequality between men and women in the sharing of
power and decision-making at all levels; insufficient mechanisms to promote the
advancement of women; and the stereotyping of women and the inequality in women's
access to and participation in communication systems, especially the media (UN, 1995).
This engagement was further demonstrated by a number of events, in the run-up to the
adoption of Resolution 1325 (2002). The following deserve mention:
Cl International Women's Day (8 March) in 1999 had the theme "Women Uniting for
Peace". On this occasion, several UN entities emphasised the importance of women's
involvement in peace activities. The President of the Security Council, on behalf of
the Security Council, stressed the need for adequate representation of women at all
decision-making levels with regard to conflict resolution.
Cl The Beijing+5 process where progress in terms of the implementation of Resolution
1325 was assessed by both the UN and independent experts (Women Building Peace,
2000).
Despite agreement on a number of actions, the document, intended for adoption at the
Beijing+5 Special Session, did not address some concerns highlighted by NGOs. There is no
mention of the need for peace and tolerance education and non-violent conflict resolution
training; the need for research and policy development on conflict prevention, gender
sensitive indicators, women's peace building efforts, and gender-sensitive post-conflict
recovery programmes, and other issues relating to conflict and peace is not acknowledged;
and, no progress has been made on arms reduction or measures to limit the proliferation of
arms and landmines that primarily harm women and children (Women Building Peace, 2000).
On October 23-24,2000, the Security Council convened to debate the role and experience of
women in situations of conflict, peacekeeping and peace building. As a result, Resolution
1325 (2000), adopted on 31 October, calls for:
Cl Increased protection of women and girls during war;
Cl Prosecution of violent crimes against women;
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[J The appointment of more women to UN peacekeeping operations and field missions;
[J Actions by Governments and all UN agencies to ensure that more women participate
in decision-making to end conflict and build peace at the national, regional and
international level (See Appendix I for more details).
Resolution 1325 specifically calls for all actors involved to adopt a gender perspective in all
phases of conflict resolution, with specific emphasis on the implementation phases, which, in
effect, translates into post-conflict reconstruction. More specifically, it calls for "measures
that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as
they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary" (UN
Security Council, 2000). It provides guidelines for infusing a gender perspective in dealing
with issues such as repatriation of refugees and other displaced persons, DDR, amnesty
provisions, and humanitarian assistance - all of which are particularly relevant to the DRC.
In October 2002, the UN Secretary General released a study on women, peace and security as
mandated by paragraph 16 of Resolution 1325 and prepared in cooperation with the Special
Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women and the Inter-agency Taskforce on
Women, Peace and Security. This study documents the impact of armed conflict on women
and girls, the role of women in peace building, and the gender dimensions of peace processes
and conflict resolution. It indicates that while women and girls share experiences with men
and boys during armed conflict, the culture of violence and discrimination against women
and girls that exists during peace times is often exacerbated during conflict and negatively
affects women's ability to participate in peace processes, ultimately inhibiting the attainment
of lasting peace. The report outlines a number of proposed actions for the attention of the
Security Council. These will be discussed in a later section on the role of the international
community in the DRC.
4.2.2 REGIONAL - OAV/AV and NEPAD
Both the African Union (AU) and NEPAD call for gender equality. One of the 16 principles
of the AU Constitutive Act is the promotion of gender equality. African Heads of State
further endorsed a set of recommendations allowing for 50 per cent participation of women in
the work of the new Union (Vimla Huree-Agarawal, quoted in UN Security Council 2002).
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This principle extends to the posts of Commissioners of the African Union - where 5 out of
the 10 appointees should be women. In a statement by the OAU Secretary General, Amara
Essy, to the 76th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Durban, South Africa in
July 2002, he also specifically refers to the challenge of bringing peace to the continent while
women continue to be marginalized in the management of African countries and Institutions
(Essy, 2002). The Durban Declaration in Tribute to the OAU on the Occasion of the African
Union (2002) acknowledged the importance of women's contributions: "We reaffirm, in
particular, the pivotal role of women in all levels of society and recognise that the objectives
of the African Union cannot be achieved without the full involvement and participation of
women at all levels and structures of the Union".
The AU protocol furthermore stipulates that at least one woman from every country should
be represented in the proposed pan-African parliament, one of the 17 institutions of the
African Union. In an interview with a reporter from All Africa, Frene Ginwala, South
Africa's Speaker of Parliament, goes further to suggest that all five members of the AU's
Peace and Security Council - intended to help curb continental conflict - should be women
"because women don 't make war". However, most of the delegations of the 54 African
States were virtually devoid of women - a fact that does not bode well for the implementation
of these commitments.
Promoting the role of women in all activities is one of the two long-term objectives of
NEPAD (NEPAD, 2001, Paragraph 67). In the section on the "New Political Will of African
Leaders", NEP AD talks of ''promoting the role of women, by ensuring their participation in
the political and economic life of African countries". Furthermore, in the Declaration on
Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (NEPAD, 2002), the signatories
furthermore reaffirm their full and continuing commitment to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing
Declaration (par. 4); acknowledge that women and children bear the brunt of conflicts and
undertake to "end the moral shame exemplified by the plight of women" (par. 10); accept the
"binding obligation to ensure that women have every opportunity to contribute on [sic] terms
of full equality to political and socio-economic development" (par. 11); and vouch to "work
with renewed vigour to ensure gender equality and ensure thefull and effective integration of
women inpolitical and socio-economic development".
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4.2.3 SUB-REGIONAL- SADe
As recognised partners in the efforts of both the AU and NEPAD, regional organisations play
an important role in the implementation of the objectives and aims of these two African
initiatives. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is such a regional
organisation and recently accepted the DRC as its youngest member.
In 1997 SADC Heads of State adopted the Declaration on Gender and Development as a
result of extensive lobbying by the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC), created out of the
pre-Beijing task force of stakeholders in the region. The Declaration aims at:
CJ Achieving at least a 30 per cent target of women in political and decision-making
structures by 2005;
CJ Promoting women's full access to, and control over productive resources to reduce
the level of poverty among women;
CJ Repealing and reforming all laws, amending constitutions and changing social
practices which sill subject women to discrimination;
CJ Taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of violence
against women and children.
Along with the Declaration, SADC adopted a policy and institutional framework for gender
mainstreaming. This resulted in the establishment of a Gender Unit at the SADC Secretariat,
a Committee of Ministers responsible for Gender or Women's Affairs, the RAC - made up of
Government and NGO representatives - and Gender Focal Points in the Sector Co-ordinating
Units.
The agenda at regional level was determined by the identification of national priorities
derived from the 12 critical concerns of the Beijing PFA. Four priority areas were identified
at regional level: education, health, power and decision-making, poverty and violence against
women. In support of the implementation of measures to address these concerns, the "SADC
Gender Monitor: Monitoring Implementation of the Beijing Commitments by SADC Member
States", was launched. Published annually by SADC and the Southern African Resource and
Documentation Centre (SARDC), the Gender Monitor aims to track and highlight progress
made on implementation while also facilitating the exchange of ideas and experiences and
highlighting obstacles hindering the realisation of the goals set in the PFA (SADC, 1999).
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By adopting the Addendum to the Declaration on Gender and Development, entitled "The
Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women and Children", in 1998, SADC
Heads of State further recognised the gendered nature of violence at all levels, including
during armed conflict, and adopted measures aimed at improving the legal, social, economic,
cultural and political situation of women to combat this scourge. Further emphasis was placed
on the provision of services, education, training and awareness-building, integrated
approaches and sufficient budgetary allocations.
4.3 APPLVING THESE FRAMEWORKS TO THE DRC
The importance of the full participation of women in the reconstruction of the DRC has been
acknowledged in a wide range of forums. For example:
CJ At a conference held on "Electoral perspectives and the process of democratisation in
the DRC: Lessons from SADC Countries" (EISA, 2002), special concern was
expressed for the recognition of the rights of women, their role in the election process,
and the provision of skills and education. Participants further agreed that it was vital
that the gender principle be taken into account at the time of appointing members to
the Electoral Commission and in the compilation of party lists (in the event of a
closed list proportional system).
CJ In a recent workshop, entitled 'Rethinking Peace, Coexistence and Human Security in
the Great Lakes Region' (April 16 - 19, 2002 Kigali, Rwanda), sessions on
Coexistence Projects and Peace building approaches focused specifically on Women's
groups/associations.
With this in mind, a layered but coordinated response to the situation of women in the DRC,
in the post-conflict period, needs to be guided by the above frameworks. There is clearly no
lack of acknowledgement of the importance of gender equality in the different forums, but it
is also evident that implementation has all but stalled in many instances and that the positive
impact on women's lives remain marginal. However, sufficient overlap and shared purpose
between the various initiatives would allow for the coordination of efforts in the case of the
Congo while avoiding duplication and the waste of precious resources. If the theory holds up,
such cooperation would substantially alter gender relations within the DRC and considerably
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improve the chances of lasting peace in the war-tom society. What should be remembered is
that, at this point in time, there is not yet peace and security in many parts of the DRC and
intervention strategies need to consider the delicate balance and reciprocal relationship that
exists between advancement (of women's rights, and in the broader sense) and peace
(conceived in terms of true human security).
4.3.1 EMPOWERING WOMEN IN THE DRC
"Revindications [sic) of the sub-region of the Great Lakes
We the women of the sub-region of the Great Lakes, are tired of living in a world where
injustice reigns; a world of gender-based inequalities, a world where wealth is concentrated
in the hands of afew.
We the women of the sub-region of the Great Lakes, are left to live in a world where our
rights are regularly negated by compliant local authorities and the national, regional and
international community.
We, the women members of the Network of Womens' [sic] Collectives and Associations of the
sub-region of the Great Lakes, are hungry for a better world where wealth is shared, where
women are respected for their integrity as well as physically and mentally.
We, the women members of the Network of Womens' [sic] Collectives and Associations of the
sub-region of the Great Lakes, request the following from our states and the International
Community:
1. Recognition of women as an integral part and focal point in the search for peace in the
Great Lakes region.
2. An end to wars which ravage life in the sub-region of the Great Lakes
3. The development of mechanisms of conflict prevention and identification of resources
supporting the sale of arms. We say 'STOP' to countries, which hide behind their
economic interests leaving the sub-region underfire and bloodstained.
4. The establishment of mechanisms which can condemn and punish all crimes committed in
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(PeaceWomen,2002)
the sub-region of the Great Lakes
5. The adoption of measures, which unconditionally absolve debt infavor of socio-economic
rehabilitation programmes of countries in the Great Lakes sub-region.
6. The revision of national and international legislation and development of mechanisms,
which ensure the elimination of all inequalities based on gender.
7. The adoption of severe and rigorous legislation against rape and sexual abuse
8. The adoption and support of realistic programmes to improve the education of girls.
9. The support of self-development efforts of women in the Great Lakes region
10. That the struggle against HIV/AIDS be made a high priority in the sub-region of the
Great Lakes"
Congolese women's calls for help resound loud and clear. They are ready and waiting to be
empowered. But homegrown initiatives desperately need the support of outside partners in
this country where women are still regarded as sex objects and where fetching clean drinking
water can be a life-threatening activity. Democratic elections are scheduled to take place in
the DRC within two years from December 2002. Whether women will be able to actively
take part in these elections in order to fill their rightful place in the decision-making
structures of the Congolese society will be a function of political will, responsibility, and
good common sense on the parts of all those with a stake in the future of the DRC.
The transitional Government will have to playa particularly important role in enabling
women to become partners for peace in the Congo. At the end of January 2003. a transitional
constitution will be made public. It can only be hoped that the importance of gender issues
and women's rights compelled those who drafted it to enshrine non-discrimination and
human rights (as the special rights of all people based on their differences and similarities) in
the country's primary legal instrument. Due consideration ought to also be given to the
introduction of a quota system for party lists and Government seats (locally, regionally as
well as nationally) to ensure compliance with the SADC goal of 30 per cent representation of
women in positions of responsibility. Furthermore, sufficient checks and balances need to be
built into the system to avoid the relapse of the newly created Ministry For the Situation of
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Women and the Family (which, according to the Pretoria II Agreement, ironically has fallen
into the hands of the perpetrators of some of the worst and most systematic violations of
women's rights, the RCD) into inaction, while the Ministry for Regional Cooperation should
be constantly engaged by regional institutions.
4.3.2 WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS IN THE DRC
In the DRC a number of organisations have been formed in support of women's rights and
advancement. Examples include the Conseil National de la Femme (National Women's
Council), the Association des Femmes pour le Progrés (AFEPRO) and AFECEF, an umbrella
organization for 49 community-based organisations in South Kivu province. These groups
are collaborating on issues that:
CJ Provide leadership and human rights training for member associations;
CJ Organize peaceful demonstrations, peace and human rights conferences and seminars;
CJ Set up psychological therapy for women victims of rape and other sexual violence
while advocating against sexual violence;
CJ Create networks with regional women groups such as Burundi and Rwanda as a way
of strengthening the lobby for peace and conflict resolution in the region (Deodatte,
2002a).
More recently a newly formed women's group, "Amazons for Peace", launched a petition
calling for the retreat of Rwandan troops from the DRC. "We are exhausted by this war,"
member Aena Takwaulu said. "Our men have not succeeded in bringing peace so, in line
with tradition, the Amazons have come out of theforest," she said and added: "When the men
fail, the women unite to impose their own solutions in the interest of the community" (AFP,
2002).
Women's organisations do not, however, operate in a secure environment In the DRC.
Suspicion and distrust between women from different ethnic and political groupings often
create friction. But much worse still is the suspicion that various belligerents, and in
particular the Government, harbours with regard to the attempts of women to organise
themselves for peace or empowerment. The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
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Rights in the DRC notes in his report to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that
the situation in the country is particularly grim for women in this category. The Rapporteur
mentions, "there have been systematic violations of the rights of women's groups and their
leaders to freedom of association and assembly, expression and opinion, as well as their right
to life, physical integrity and individual liberty. In the eyes of the Government, for example,
NGOs are in the service of political parties and on the payroll of the aggressor states and
rebels, whereas the RCD regards them as a grouping of extremist political parties. Seen
through the distorting lens of ideology, these views are responsible for the mistreatment
reserved for women who are social advocates or human rights activists by the two main sides
in the ongoing war in the DRC." (Banda Mbombo & Hemedi Bayolo, 2002)
4.4 THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE ACTORS
4.4.1 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONDC, is one of the five recent operations of
the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) where the resolutions regarding
women and armed conflict are being tested. A gender section is charged with raising the
gender awareness of MONDC personnel, agency partners and the population. Already in
2002 the gender section convened a strategic planning meeting with the Mission's military
and civilian staff to create an action plan for integrating the concept of gender into all
MONUC activities (Annan, 2002). In addition, induction programmes are offered to
incoming military, civilian and police staff and gender awareness training for trainers of local
police. This is complemented by the holding of meetings with Congolese civil society
organisations, media and church organisations across the country to discuss views of the
peace process. "The major outcome of such work is to harmonize the vision of women's
groups from the east and west so that they can work out strategies to ensure their full
participation in the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration adopted prior to the inter-
Congolese dialogue. A plan of action to address the reports of violence against women in the
east was also discussed by various stakeholders" (Annan, 2002). Many of these initiatives are
still in the early stages, and substantial reports on progress have not yet been publicly
released.
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The recent study of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace and Security (UN Secretary-
General, 2002) provides some insights into the situation in the Congo, and it is of cardinal
importance that such documentation is widely distributed and well publicised in order to raise
awareness of the efforts of the UN across the globe. Raised awareness in all countries might
aide attempts at ensuring greater gender equality in peacekeeping operations by compelling
troop contributing states to increase the number of women forming part of the military and
civilian components made available to the UN for this purpose.
Despite the apparent successes of the UN in implementing Resolution 1325, independent
assessments have found that a gender perspective is not yet sufficiently incorporated into
peacekeeping operations and that collective efforts to implement Resolution 1325 had not
been as good as they could be (UN Security Council, 2002). Of the 46 special representatives
of the Secretary-General there has been only one female, and only three deputies out of 12.
Apart from its responsibilities in terms of gendering the peacekeeping missions dispatched
under its auspices, the UN and its composite member states carry a number of other
responsibilities in ensuring an improvement of the situation of the women in the DRC.
Measures to be adopted could include the following
o The creation of a senior gender adviser within DPKO and the appointment of more
female special representatives of the Secretary-General.
o The development of a code of conduct to prevent and punish abuses committed by
peacekeepers or members of the humanitarian community. This will necessitate the
creation of a Rape Tribunal.
o Revision of standard operating procedures to include gender perspectives and gender
awareness training packages intended for peacekeeping personnel.
o The stimulation of debate from the top. The men who ran most of the missions should
possess the right sensitivities and priorities. It is therefore important that they are
engaged at the highest level.
o With regard to MONDC: "Equip MONUC with a specialist conflict resolution team to
assist humanitarian aid agencies in gaining access to the Kivu and Ituri regions and
to establish reconciliation programs between local communities" (ICG, 2002: 17).
[J Go beyond abstractions and provide straight facts. Both of the effects of conflict on
women and women's role in conflict settlement and reconstruction to date. With
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regard to the situation in the DRC, "...it is urgent that the independent commission of
inquiry be set up by the UN based on the relevant Security Council Resolutions
(RS1243 (1999) point 7, RES 1304 (2000) point 13) and the UN Commission on
Human Rights (56th and sr" sessions) to determine the full magnitude of the violence
and identify all those responsible (perpetrators, co-perpetrators, accomplices,
commanding authority ...). regardless of their status (political, military civilian,
official, non-official, national or foreign) "(Banza Mbombo & Hemedi Bayolo,
2002). Such a project has to run hand in hand with a critical reassessment of security
issues, with parties looking beyond the military dimension (specifically Uganda,
Rwanda) to search for real solutions.
o The annual appointment of one of the Security Council representatives to follow the
progress made by the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1325:
Women, Peace and Security.
o The full inclusion of women in DDR programmes.
o The tireless support, financial and otherwise, of NGO activities from the international
community in attempts to strengthen the legitimacy of their roles in the eyes of the
regimes in power. One such important initiative, worthy of direct UN support is the
international coalition formed in support of the women of the DRC and the Nairobi
Declaration. According to Solon Helal (2002) the mandate of the coalition is to:
1. Ensure the visibility and presence of the women in the processes of the
consolidation of peace in the DRC.
2. Work towards obtaining the participation of women in all the components of
the lCD with the objective of arriving at a 30% target.
3. Apply UN Security Council Resolution 1325 to the situation in the DRC
4. Defend women's rights in situations of conflict and to put an end to impunity.
o Implement urgent measures to limit the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
in the Great Lakes region;
o Develop a systematic means of employing women as planners and beneficiaries of
collective efforts (UN SC, 2002);
u Creating channels in the international media for highlighting the plight of the women
in the DRC in order to gamer support, establish solidarity and raise funds for the
implementation of empowerment programmes.
o Spare no effort in maintaining basic social services, especially for the women and
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children of the DRC in the post-conflict situation;
CJ The SC should seek to identify best practices and encourage their promulgation;
CJ Creating a line of finance for gender issues from within the regular budget of the UN
rather than relying on voluntary contributions;
CJ Financial support of regional and sub-regional as well as individual efforts to
engender peace-building in the DRC, or coordinate such efforts;
CJ The UN should, furthermore, coordinate plans with regional and sub-regional
organizations and NGOs, in order to sensitise everyone involved about gender-based
violence and avoid duplication and the waste of precious resources;
CJ And ensure that involvement on the part of Western countries is better coordinated
and more consistent.
In an interview with Rose Mpisi, Director of a South African based organisation, All African
Women for Peace (AAWP), the importance of cooperation with regional and sub-regional
organisations, and local women's groups is self-evident in the case of the DRC. Because of
the particularities of the situation of women - before, during and after conflict - in countries
such as the DRC, the impact of the efforts of UNIFEM are often limited if not mediated by
women who have had personal experience of the circumstances in the country or in similar
situations.
4.4.2 THE ROLE OF THE AU AND NEPAD
Within the African Union and NEP AD, it is a matter of urgency to implement the good
intentions voiced by Heads of State in public forums in the past year. Gender mainstreaming
should form an integral part of the operationalisation of both these initiatives from the outset.
Both bodies should furthermore accept, with immediate effect, their responsibilities towards
the DRC and the attainment of a lasting peace in the country. Success in this regard will go a
long way towards proving the seriousness of the intent that has been expressed with regard to
good governance and regional responsibility. The DRC is a country rich in resources that has
the potential for playing an important role in the future of the continent. By ensuring that the
peace-building process in the country is gendered, the AU and NEP AD can assure that the
DRC can quickly attain its rightful status in improving the situation of all on the continent.
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Unfortunately, the reality has thus far been a lot different. Representatives from the DRC did
not attend the African regional symposium on gender, politics, peace, conflict prevention and
resolution held in London in 1998, and neither was the DRC on the agenda (Women's
International News, 1998).
At the regional level, the AU should implement measures to improve the monitoring and
evaluation of progress towards the BFPA. In this regard, training workshops should be held
and the AU Gender Desk should commission national evaluation reports.
A standing committee or committees need to be established between various groups on the
management of some of the contested areas, such as the eastern parts of the Congo, with
Rwanda. Such constant engagement once again signals a 'feminist' preference for
cooperation rather than competition. A regional standing committee on the general situation
in the Great Lakes District is a logical parallel process. Because of the overlapping areas of
sub-regional organisations and the lack of a clear mandate and authority in this regard, as
well as the severe lack of capacity experienced by most organisations, this is an issue that
could be best addressed at continental level.
The AU and NEPAD should coordinate efforts at the regional level and provide institutional
as well as financial support to such efforts while acting as a go-between with international
efforts. Acting as a clearing-house for information, the AU could furthermore play an
important role in allowing vanous sub-regional organisations to share experiences and
intangible resources.
4.4.3 THE ROLE OF SADe
Within the SADC framework, many countries in Southern Africa have increased the number
of decision-makers in formal positions, while training programmes and policies reflect a
greater emphasis on gender equality. Legislation has also been changed in most countries to
outlaw discriminatory practices and make provision for affirmative action and equal
representation. Up until now, the DRC did not, however, take part in these processes and no
initiatives were forthcoming from the regional organisation to bolster the efforts of women in
the DRC to improve their situation. The SADC Sectoral Report on Women and Gender
53
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(2000-2001) only once makes mention of the DRC, and that is to report that a centre for the
counselling of women and children survivors of violence has been established in the DRC
(such centres have also been established in most other SADC countries: Angola, Botswana,
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia).
While, in terms of the promotion of peace and stability in the SADC region, the report merely
laments, in general terms, the lack of information on the situation of women from countries in
the region that are experiencing conflict, as well as the limited role of women in conflict
resolution.
The DRC has basically been excluded from all regional (SADC) attempts at main streaming
gender and achieving gender equity. When the SADC Gender Unit commissioned a book
series on the status of women and men in the SADC region, the DRC was excluded from the
countries on which a national gender profile were compiled. It is the responsibility of the
regional body to change this situation.
While the DRC geographically fits more comfortably into the Central African region, and
overlapping membership with other regional institutions creates further problems, the fact
that the country was allowed to join the SADC in 2000 is a reality, and with an end to the
conflict in sight, SADC needs to take decisive action to ensure that the potential benefits of
DRC membership of the organisation can be realised. One area for action is immediate
integration of the DRC, and in particular its women, into regional efforts at mainstreaming
gender at all levels of society. Specific avenues for action include the following:
CJ Undertaking research studies on gender and related issues, while ways to improve the
use and distribution of information in the region need to be identified.
CJ Supporting civic organisations and women's NGOs to increase women's capacity to
participate in decision-making leadership and encourage the cooperation between
Governments and civil society on a broader scale.
CJ Exerting pressure upon the transitional authority in the DRC to develop a National
Gender Policy, create sufficient institutional mechanisms to design, promote, monitor,
advocate and mobilise support for policies to advance the status of women, and
establish a documentation unit in the Ministry for Women and Family to accurately
record women's experiences and empowerment.
CJ Adopt legally binding instruments and protocols at regional level that encourage
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member states to incorporate them into their constitutions and legislation. This applies
in particular to those protocols and issues related to the rights and needs of women as
a social group, and needs to be supplemented by some form of enforcement
mechanism to compel countries to carry out obligations.
1:1 Consult with other regional organisations on the issue of gender mainstreaming to
learn from shared experiences.
1:1 Organise regional workshops and training exercises in order for Governments to share
experiences and build capacity.
1:1 Promulgate a set of best practices and indicators for gender empowerment.
1:1 Support a national audit on women's participation in decision-making aimed at the
development of a coordinated approach to increasing participation to the desired
levels of 30 per cent.
1:1 Coordinate political education programmes to increase the number of women in
decision-making positions. This should be supported by workshops for prospective
women political candidates in lobbying, advocacy and campaign management.
1:1 Integrate Congolese women into regional projects such as a Regional Caucus of
Women Parliamentarians to ensure that women's issues are put on the agenda of
decision-making institutions at the regional level;
1:1 Establish trans-border standing committees on integrating a gender perspective into
all the activities of the region;
1:1 With regard to the economic empowerment of women in the post-conflict phase in the
DRC, SADC should assist the drawing up of a gender budget and other initiatives at
improving women's access to resources and economic decision-making capacity;
1:1 Conduct legal literacy campaigns for counselling women on legal issues, raise
awareness of their rights and responsibilities and the sensitisation of the general
public on legal issues through radio programmes and publications also falls within the
scope of SADC's responsibility towards the women of the DRC;
1:1 A need has been expressed by women in the region that SADC should establish the
human rights tribunal provided for under article 16 of the SADC Treaty and that this
should deal with violations of women's rights;
1:1 Assist the DRC in the rebuilding of its educational institutions with the specific aim of
eliminating the gender gap in primary and secondary education by 2005;
1:1 As a regional block, SADC should unite to lobby for gender issues in other forums;
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o In the last instance, the other SADC states need to lead by example and take
immediate actions to ensure the full implementation of the Declaration on Gender and
Development and the freedom of action of civil society within their own countries.
4.5 CONCLUSION
From the evidence presented in this chapter, we can see that it is not for a lack of bureaucracy
and intent that the situation of the women many countries in the world remain abhorrent.
What is now needed is efficient and cooperative collaboration between structures at various
structures to stretch limited resources. It is also apparent that the various institutions share a
common goal, and the empowerment of Congolese Women could provide a common
medium-term goal to guide strategic interaction between these different bodies.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The President of the Association des Femmes pour le Progrés (AFEPRO), Marthe
Tshisekedi, describes the main daily activities of a typical African women, and, thus, of a
Congolese woman, as follows:
...if one observes a typical day in the life of an African woman one realizes
that she is engaged in a daily race against the clock. She is not only a
mother, wife, and housewife, but also a teacher, merchant or nurse ...She
takes on several roles at once ...However, despite their active role, instead of
being liberated, African women - even those living in urban areas - are
governed by customs that turn them into little more than "an erotic
complement to men" and relegate them to the informal sector ...ln the state of
conflict affecting our country, this woman easily becomes not only a "sexual
slave" used against her will by combatants from all sides for their own
recreation, but also, by virtue of her status as a keeper of traditions, a prime
target of deliberate efforts to destabilize the socio-cultural foundations of the
communities whose synergy makes up the Congolese nation (Banda Mbombo
and Hemedi Bayolo, 2002).
5.2 WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN WAR AND PEACE
The evidence presented here indicates that the experiences of women during times of war are
neither homogenous, nor easy to comprehend and address. While mostly perceived as victims
of armed conflict, women and girls can also be combatants and perpetrators, and in such
cases they must be brought on equal terms with men into the process of disarmament,
demobilisation, resettlement and capacity-building after the conflict ended. This is true also
of girl soldiers, a category of combatants often disregard in post-war efforts and left out of
agreements between political brokers. But this does not negate the urgent need for a gendered
approach to studying the effects of conflict, as it remains true that there are differences in the
ways that women and men take part in and are affected by violent conflict. This fact has been
acknowledged in a wide range of forums and is enjoying increasing attention from various
sources.
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Social construction theory teaches us the fallacy of essentialist notions of men and women
based on theories of biological (pre-)determination. At the same time it highlights the
pervasive and often destructive effects of stereotyping and role fulfilment. When applied to
conflict situations in the form of gender theory, it exposes the complexity of the linkage
between peace and gender. Women and girls share similar experiences with men and boys
during conflicts, but the differences that exist in society in times of peace are exacerbated
during periods of conflict. Women's vulnerability during times of crisis is thus not a result of
women's nature, but rather a result of the social structures and mechanisms that tum women
into victims and reproduce or even increase their vulnerability in times of crisis. There is also
a narrow definition of who a soldier or fighter is, which often discriminates against women
and girls involved in fighting. This forces the realisation that the protection of women in
times of armed conflict must begin during times of peace.
If it is accepted that periods of war are usually followed by periods of relative peace, with the
ever-present potential for further eruptions of violent conflict, the DRC is currently posed on
the knife's edge. Unless the structures and mechanisms that increase the vulnerability of
women and supports and legitimises war, violence, inequality and aggression are not
challenged and deconstructed as gendered, and replaced by alternative social institutions,
initial gains in post-war reconstruction are likely to eventually result in the reinforcement of
the relations of domination which makes war more likely in the first place. What happens
now in the DRC will have significant implications for the sustainability of peace and the
creation of adequate mechanisms for empowerment of the disenfranchised, with effective
preventative mechanisms in place to prevent a relapse into war.
5.3 FROM WAR TO PEACE IN THE DRC
In lieu of adequate measures to bring to justice those perpetrators of gender-based violence
against women and redress gender imbalances in the fabric of the Congolese society, it is
likely that violence against women and girls during armed conflict will persist as domestic
violence when the conflict is over.
In the post-war social milieu of heightened uncertainty about gender role definition, the
conditions for both challenge and conflict are created. The experiences of women who have
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been forced by conditions in the DRC to step out of the traditional gender roles and assume
new responsibilities as, for example, head of household or demobilised militia fighter do not
bode well for the creation of a post-patriarchal, non-discriminatory society in the DRC.
Intense frustration and distress is often accentuated by the hostile and suspicious attitudes that
these women are confronted with in their home villages. Where men have also been
traumatised and uprooted by the conflict, the situation takes on an even darker hue as many
women also experience increases in domestic violence and abuse linked to male insecurity.
Women who have been the victims of sexual acts of violence are often ostracized by their
communities and find themselves forced to tum to prostitution and other activities outside the
dominant frameworks of wife, mother or virgin daughter.
Post-conflict reconstruction needs to be sensitive to the redefinition and renegotiation of
gender roles that is likely to characterise the post-conflict society and avoid the pitfalls of
perpetuating unhelpful stereotypes. This process affects men and women differently and an
exclusive focus on either sex will be grossly counterproductive. A differentiated focus, on the
other hand, will acknowledge the role that women continue to playas custodians of culture
and tradition in their role as carers for children and the concentration of their activities around
the home. If gender-equality becomes a long-term process, men's socialisation will start
playing an increasingly important role in influencing culture and tradition at the early phases
of childhood development as social roles become more fluid and men take on child rearing
responsibilities while women keep on pursuing the careers that they took up during the
conflict. A gender perspective would thus aim at exposing the gendered nature of social
institutions, assigning responsibility for those structures and their reconstruction to both men
and women.
5.4 PROSPECTS FOR A GENDERED APPROACH TO CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT
Never before has the plight of women in conflict situations or the importance of infusing a
gender perspective into peace-building enjoyed as much attention as at the present. The
modem global society furthermore has all the means at its disposal to launch massive
campaigns towards implementing the principles and mechanisms for gender mainstreaming
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so eloquently expounded in (male dominated) political forums. Now the issue becomes one
of political will and careful auditing to determine whether required inputs will deliver desired
returns in a world that is split between the capitalist moguls on the one side and corrupt
autocrats on the other. As with any long-term investment into the future of an organisation or
society, the dramatic changes that are required will unsettle existing power-relations to such
an extent that the short-term benefits will probably appear insufficient to spur the required
political will. Despite public proclamations to the contrary, the most likely situation into the
future is not one in which dramatic changes will take place and where the current generations
will benefit substantially from the gains. In fact, the slow, but incremental process can be
expected to continue at more or less its current pace, with occasional bursts of enthusiastic
action. What can, at best, be hoped for, is that the situation in the DRC will be regarded as a
sufficiently cost-effective experiment for gender-based approaches and the implementation of
the plethora of overlapping bureaucratic frameworks that they have spumed.
Ruddick points to the potential of maternal practice to develop ways of
dealing with conflict that are consistent with the goals of mothering. Such
practices are marginalised as a result of women's marginal position in
society's power structure. As Enloe (1993:246) puts it, militarisation occurs
because some peoples'fears are allowed to be heard, and to inform agendas,
while other peoples' fears are trivialised or silenced. The point is that
altitudes of peace and caring are marginalised and that this arises from a
social milieu in which war, violence, inequality and aggression have come to
be legitimised; and unequal gender relationships and socially constructed
gender stereotypes are very central to the process of legitimisation. By
uncritically adopting these stereotypes, those with an interest in peace-
building become part of the problem. As Ruddick (1995:xviii) points out,
"neither women nor mothers, nor for that matter men nor fathers, are
'peaceful'''. Instead, we need to understand that to the extent that a politics of
peace, care and justice is possible, it must be created and actively fostered. "
(Vincent,2001)
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APPENDIX A: DRC FACT FILE
GENERAL INFORMA TION
Official Name: République démocratique du Congo, or Democratic Republic of the Congo
(formerly Zaire)
Capital: Kinshasha - population 5, 1m (1997 est)
Chief of State, Head of President Joseph Kabila - 24th January 2001 appointed by the Government.
Government & Min. of
Defence:
National Currencies And Congolese francs (FC) = 100 new zaires; Average exchange rate in 1999:
Current Exchange Rates: FC4.1 :US:$I; Exchange rate on 29/4/2001 - FC50.5:US$1 (fixed official rate);
FC255.5:US$1 (parallel rate). There is a marked difference between the
exchange rate in the east and the west of the country. Note: the exchange rate
has been falling steadily on the parallel market since Laurent Kabila's
assassination in January 2001, despite the liberalization of exchange
transactions in February.
System Of Government: Unitary republic
Population: 53,6m
Ethnic Groups: Over 200 African ethnic groups. The largest is the Kongo, which predominates
in Bandundu province. The Mongo are mainly found in the heavily forested
north and north-west. The Luba predominate in the two Kasai provinces and
the Shabans and Bemba live mainly in Katanga (formerly Shaba) province.
Other large ethnic groups include the Zande, the Bwaka, the Lulua and the
Songe. There are a large number of people of Nil otic origin, mainly
concentrated in the eastern North Kivu province.
Languages: French (official), Lingala and Monokutuba (lingua franca trade languages),
Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili), Kikongo (most users), Tshiluba
Religions: Animist beliefs around 50%; Christian 40% (of whom the majority are Roman
Catholic); Muslim 10% (mainly in northern Kivu province)"
GEOGRAPHY
Total Area: 2,345,410sq km
Land Area: 2,267,600sq km
Water: 77,810 km
Coastline: 37 km
15 These figures are from the Institute for Security Studies (2002a). An Agence France-Presse ORC Country
Profile puts the figure at 80% Christian with small minorities of Muslims (10%) and animists. In further contrast,
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2002a) gives the following breakdown: Roman
Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%, Kinganguist 10%, Muslim 10%, other sects and indigenous beliefs 10%.
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Climate Varies widely - lowlands in the western region are tropical; hot & humid in
equatorial river basin; cooler and drier in southern highlands; cooler and wetter
in eastern highlands
Physical Description Large and diverse, country straddles the equator. Vast central basin in a low-
lying plateau covered by dense tropical rain forest; central river basin with a
large number of rivers flowing into the Congo River which provides a major
transport system. Mountains in the east, falling gradually to a very narrow strip
of land that controls the lower Congo River which is the only outlet to South
Atlantic Ocean. The southern part of the country is savannah grassland
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Communication: per 1,000 Daily newspapers 3
Inhabitants (1997) Radio receivers 376
Television receivers 135
Main telephone lines 0
Transportation: Railways 5,138kms
Roads 157,000 krns; 2,400 of which are surfaced
Waterways 5,000 km including the Congo, its tributaries, and unconnected
lakes. Inland navigation is important, particularly for freight on the Congo
River between Kinshasa and Kisangani and the Kasai River from lIebo to the
Congo River north of Kinshasa. However, all routes around Kisangani have
been disrupted by the civil war.
Airports with paved runways 24
Ports and harbours The main port is Matadi, about 150km inland on the
Congo River. Kinshasa is the main inland river port and the ferry crossing
point from Brazzaville.
Energy Provision: 5,74 bn kWh (1998). By source: fossil fuel 2.61%; hydro 97.39%. Total
hydroelectric potential is estimated at 100,00 mw thanks to the Congo River;
total installed generating capacity is only 2,470 mw.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
DRC, the third largest country in Africa, is endowed with vast potential wealth. It is rich in minerals, has fertile
land and enormous areas of rainforest (more than 74% of the country is forested, although the forests are
shrinking fast), and its rivers offer abundant hydroelectric potential.
Mineral Resources Cobalt (65% of the world's reserves), copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial
and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc,manganese, tin, germanium, uranium,
radium, bauxite, iron ore, coal
Other: Hydropower (total potential estimated at 100,000 mw, enough to meet at least
all of Southern African needs); timber; oil reserves of 180 million barrels
Water Resources and Annual internal renewable water resources: 19,001 cu m Per Capita (1998);
Management: Sectoral withdrawals Domestic 61%; Industrial 16%; Agricultural 23%.
Key Environmental Poaching threatens wildlife populations; water pollution; deforestation -
Concerns: refugees who arrived in mid-1994 were responsible for significant
deforestation; soil erosion; and wildlife poaching in the eastern part of the
country
Environmental Policy and International agreements - Biodiversity, climate Change, Desertification,
Manifestation Endangered Species, Hazardous Wasters, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping,
Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Tropical timer 83 and 94, Wetlands
Natural Hazards Periodic droughts in south; volcanic activity
ECONOMY
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Size of the Economy IGDP US$3,900 billions
GNP per capita US$110 (World Bank, 1998), under US$80 by 2002
GDP Growth Rate -15% (2000), -4,1% (IMF 2001 est.)
InflationlCPI (% annual 511% (2000), estimated at 135% in 2001
change) Projected to be down to 12,7% in 2002
Reserves (US$m) 52 covering 2.2 weeks (2000)
Exchange Rate (end of 310 (2001)
period in US$)
Economic Sectors Agriculture & Forestry: Despite being an agriculturally rich country that has
diverse climates, rich soils, numerous rivers and abundant rainfall, DRC is
unable to meet its food needs. This is largely attributable to neglect of the
sector by past governments, emigration of labour into mining, supply and
transport problems, the war and the influx of refugees. The main cash crops are
coffee and timber, followed by palm oil, cotton, cocoa, rubber and tobacco.
Mining: The contribution of mining has shrunk in recent years (from 24% of
GDP in 1987, to 5.9% in 1994), although it remains a key generator of export
earnings. Copper, cobalt, diamonds and zinc are the main minerals. Cadmium,
casserite, gold, silver and wolframite are mined on a smaller scale.
Industry: Contribution to GDP has dropped from a high of 33% in 1980 to
some 15%, well below the sub-Saharan average of 30%. Depressed demand,
widespread looting, a lack offoreign exchange, and political instability are the
main constraints. Goods produced are mainly for the local market.
Trade Today the narrow export base is based mainly on minerals, with some
agricultural cash crops. This has made the DRC's balance of trade susceptible
to the vagaries of world commodity markets. Under-investment and regular
strikes have further weakened the mining industry. Principal exports are copper
(typically 60% of total), diamonds (14%), cobalt (II %), crude petroleum (9%),
coffee (6%). In 1998 the services sector contributed 31.4 % of GDP in 1998,
up from 25.2 % in 1997. Diamonds, cobalt, gold and timber have continued to
be produced throughout the war, with diamonds bringing in the most income,
although production has dropped in almost all sectors. Revival of operations on
the copper belt are vital for the republic's economic future.
Foreign Aid and Donors: The DRC is one of the most heavily indebted countries in Africa - total debt
stock is estimated to be US$7.86bn, exceeded by arrears ofUS$9.5bn. The
Government has long since ceased to service its debts.
In June 2001 the DRC received a US$50m grant from the World Bank, one of
the biggest aid donations obtained by the country in two years, as well as a
US$2,5m grant from the African Development Bank aimed at supporting
macroeconomic and sectoral reforms.
External Debt: 11.9 billion dollars (World Bank, 1999)
Regional and International African Union
economic grouping/alliances: EU-ACP Convention
Southern Afircan Development Community (SADC)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Afirca (Comesa)
POPULATION
Human Development Index 0.479
(HDI)
HDI Rank 141/174
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Health There are more than 900 hospitals with a total capacity of over 75,000 beds,
but many of these are not operating due to a lack of resources and unpaid staff.
There are an estimated 1,900 physicians working in ORe. In the area of Bunia,
near the border with Uganda, there are only 11 doctors for three million people,
and there have been outbreaks of bubonic plague.
Food Security: In October 2000 the UNHeR warned that the humanitarian situation in the
ORe was heading towards catastrophe and appealed for urgent international
financial aid. It was estimated that one third or some 16m people did not to
have enough to eat. Infrastructure was non-existent, areas that used to produce
surplus food were no longer producing any, and the transport infrastructure had
been destroyed. According to the UNOP, by 2002 more than 70% of the
population are living absolute poverty.
Education School is compulsory for children between six and Il, but attendance is
estimated at 66% for male and 51% for female children - and of these only
about 40% complete the period. Secondary education, which is not
compulsory, begins at the age of 12 and also lasts for six years. Enrolment in
secondary school is less than 25 % of the relevant age group. There are three
universities - at Kinshasa, Kisangani and Lubumbashi. The literacy rate is
estimated at 83% for males and 54% for females, but is thought to be much
lower outside urban areas.
Unemployment Around 85%
Sources: Mostly Institute for Security Studies, 2002a. Also consulted: Agenee France-Presse, 2002; Mills, 2002;
UN OeHA (2002)
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APPENDIX B: PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE DRC
Involvement/Current Status
Forces on the Government side
ORC Government Controls the western and southern parts of the country
Headquarters: Kinshasa
President: Joseph Kabila
Angola Angola, which contributed significant military support to
the Government, now maintains 500 policemen in
Kinshasa.
Namibia Namibia has completely withdrawn from the DRC.
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe deployed troops in the DRC in 1998 to
support the Government of the late Laurent Kabila, and
subsequently his son Joseph.
By 29 August 2002 Zimbabwe Defence Force
spokesman Col Mbonisi Gatsheni announced that all of
Zimbabwe's troops in the DRC will be withdrawn. While
it is claimed that only 3,000 troops remain, independent
estimates range from 9,000 to 12,000.
AIiR 30-40,000
Alliance of Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu extremist
militias) and ex-FAR (Forces armées rwandaises),
Rwanda's former army
FOO Believed to total, at peak, around 15,000, split between
Forces pour la defense de la Démocratie the DRC and Tanzanian refugee camps.
Forces on the rebel side:
Burundi At peak around 2,000 troops, but announced their
withdrawal in January 2001. According the UN, 700
troops had been withdrawn as at 11 October 2002.
Rwanda, RPA Rwanda supports the rebel Rassemblement congolais
Armée Patriotique Rwandaise/Rwandan Patriotic Army pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), which has been
fighting Kinshasa since August 1998.
Kigali has justified its presence in the DRC as a measure
to prevent the ex-FAR and Interahamwe from attacking
Rwanda from bases in the DRC
Total troop strength at its peak in the DRC is estimated at
18,000. Forces in the DRC are made up of local Tutsi
and Hutu (ex-Far) elements.
Rwanda's area of operation covers Eastern DRC, mostly
the areas of South Kivu, North Kivu and Maniema, the
Eastern province, part of Katanga and Kasai
The recent Pretoria Agreement between the DRC
Government and Rwanda provides for the complete
withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC to be
verified by MONUC. According to MONUC, as at Il
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October 2002, a total number of 20,941 RPA forces had
been withdrawn from the DRC. This implies a
discrepancy of 2,819 according to RPA figures. A formal
explanation is still pending.
Uganda, UPDF Uganda has been involved in the DRC war since 2
Uganda People's Defence Forces August 1998. By early 2000 Ugandan involvement
totaled more than 13,000 troops (in 14 army battalions).
Uganda mainly supports the RCD-N and RCD-K-ML
In August 2002 the DRC and Uganda concluded an
agreement providing for the complete withdrawal of
Ugandan forces from the DRC. According to the
signatories to the accord, Uganda had, at the time, 2,500
soldiers in the DRC. With Angola serving as the third
party to this accord, it would be allowed to use its forces
in the DRC to verify the Ugandan withdrawal, Kamerhe
said.
By September 2002 Uganda had officially withdrawn all
its forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), except for two battalions which would remain to
safeguard civilian security in the troubled city of Bunia,
northeastern DRC (at the request of the United Nations)
official Radio Uganda reported.
Uganda has committed itself publicly to withdrawing the
last of its troops based in the DRC before 15 December
2002.
MLC Formed in November 1998 in Equateur Province with
Mouvement de Liberation Congolais/Congolese extensive Ugandan backing.
Liberation Movement
Headquarters: Mobutu's former 'pink palace' at Estimated between 6,500 and 9,000 troops
Gbadolite, northwestern DRC. Following the lCD, Bemba threw in his lot with the
Leader: (businessman) Jean-Pierre Bemba Government in April 2002
Controls the North.
MLC-Renove The group issued a communique on 27 August 2002 in
A group claiming to comprise the original members of which it denounced Uganda's influence on the MLC,
the Ugandan-backed Mouvement de liberation du Congo accusing Uganda of pillaging the Democratic Republic of
(MLC) rebel movement has declared the creation of a the Congo's (DRC) natural resources, and of dictatorship.
new faction to be known as MLC-Renove. It also accuses those it calls the sponsors of rebellion in
the DRC, namely neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda, of
massacres
RCD 17,000-20,000 troops
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/
Congolese Rally for Democracy By August 2002 the RCD held about a third (eastern
Also known as RCD-Goma DRC) of the war-ravaged country.
Rwandan-backed rebel group. Created out ofa split of
the RCD in May 1999, when Wamba dia Wamba broke
away to form the RCD Kisangani,
Headquarters: Goma
President Adolphe Onusumba (a South African-educated
doctor) who replaced Emile Illunga in late 2000.
RCD-Kisangani
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Wamba dia Wamba formed this party when he was ousted from the original RCD in May 1999.lt was short-lived
and became the RCD-ML in September 1999
ReD-KlML Around 2,500 troops
Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie-
Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation Control of areas in North Kivu and Ituri (by December
Kisangani faction of the RCD-ML led by Mbusa 2002).
Nyamwisi. Allied with Mayi-Mayi and Kinshasa. Also
the party of Jean-Baptiste Tibasima.
Headquartered in Bunia (also known as RCD/Bunia)
Armed wing: Armeé du people congolais/Armee
populaire congolaise
ReD-ML Not in control of any territory by December 2002
Rassemblement congolais pour la demoeratie-
Mouvement de liberation
Formed in September 1999 by Wamba dia Wamba after
he and Ugandan forces were ousted from Kisangani by
Rwanda
ReD-National
Formed during the splintering of the RCD-ML in mid-2000. Originally based in Bafwasende, Now allied with the
MLC.
Leader: Roger Lumbala
ReD-KIN
Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie-(Kisangani/)National
Rebel group created in January 2000 following a fissure within the RCD-KlML. Allegedly supported by Rwanda
FLe
Front de Libération du Congo/Congolese Liberation Front
Formed on 16 January 2001, combining Bemba's MLC and RCD-ML, as well as Lumbala's RCD-National.
Supported by Uganda. Armed wing, the Armee de Liberation Congolaise
Collapsed in August 2001
Leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba
Unarmed Opposition:
UDPS
Union pour la Démocratie et le progres social
Political opposition party
Leader: Etienne Tshisekedi
PALU
Parti Lumumbiste Unijlé/Unified Lumumbist Party
Other Forces:
Mayi-Mayi
Also Mai-Mai, a local militia group opposed to the Banyamulenge (a group of Congolese nationals who are ethnic
Rwandese. - living in North and South Kivu)
upe
Union des patriots congolais
A Hema dominated group that came to prominence after taking Bunia in August 2002. Sometimes referred to as
UPC-FRP (Front for Reconciliation and Peace). Ongoing internal power struggle between Thomas Lubanga (current
leader - allied to Rwanda) and Chief Kahwa Mandra (allied to Uganda).
Controls the regional (lturi) capital of Bunia.
Not a signatory to the 17 December Pretoria accord
NGILIMA
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The Ngilima is a grouping of warriors from different ethnic groups in the Kivu provinces, concentrated in the
Rutshuru area, who see themselves as defending the population against foreigners. They opposed Mobutu and later
also the ex-FAR and Interahamwe who had been settled in the UNHCR camps. Many of their recruits were Nande
and the language spoken among them tends to be Kinande.
Their number is estimated at between 1000 and 1400 fighters.
ZAIRIAN HUTU (MAGRIVIor Militia)
Another group of Hutu is the Zairian Hutu, who having joined forces with the Rwandan Hutu, is often included
under the general 'Hutu' label. However, care should be taken to distinguish between these two groups as they have
different political objectives which temporarily coincided. The Zairian Hutus have been in Zaire for generations and
consider themselves to be Zairian. Local authorities estimated the Hutu population at some 4-500,000 in North Kivu.
Since the ADFL take-over in the DRC, much of these Hutu militiamen have disappeared from the public eye. It is
possible that they are hiding in the rainforest or form part of number of rebel and splinter groups currently fighting in
the DRC.
FNLK
Front de Liberation Nationale du Katanga or Katanga_Tigers and the FLNC (Front de Liberation Nationale du
Congo)
UPR
Unionpour la Republique
The UPR is a movement of neo-Mobutuists of Mobutu's old MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution). They
also claim to have a military wing, consisting mainly out of ex-FAZ. None of these claims have, as yet, manifested
on the ground.
Leader: Charles Ndaywel
FLOT
Front de Liberation Contre L . Occupation
FLOT is the remnants of an anti-Tutsi movement in South Kivu created in 1977. It is made up of people who used to
follow the leadership of Charles "Simba", a Bembe who was once allied to Kabila but has broken away and has
opposed the Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). He moved on to
Tanzania to co-form the ARD to liberate eastern Congo from Tutsis and foreigners. After "Simba" has left the area,
people who were disappointed in his leadership created FLOT. Some of the FLOT members seem to be from the
educated "upper-echelons" of the Southern Kivu and Northern Katanga. It is however difficult to determine exactly
how representative the movement is, since they operate in strict secrecy. They frequently broadcast anti- Tutsi/ AFDL
programs over a mobile FM sender called "Radio des Patriots".
ARD
Alliance pour la Resistance Democratique
The aim of the ARD is to liberate Eastern DRC from Tutsis, and consists mainly out of Bembe militia. Anzuluni
Bembe succeeded in grouping together opposition forces from the DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, in a loose
alliance against Tutsi domination. The movement was initially based in Tanzania. Africa Confidential also reported
that another Bembe-dominated opposition group -- the Conseil de resistance et de liberation du Kivu -- was recently
set up in Kigoma. In Fizi, the rebels are thought to be local people in alliance with Burundian Hutus from the
CNDD's armed wing, the Front pour la defense de la Démocratie (FDD), supplemented by some former soldiers
from the Forces Armees Rwandaises (ex-FAR), and their allies from the Interahamwe militia. One leader of the Fizi
group, and reputed to be a founding member of the ARD, has taken the name of Simba and is known as Charles
Simba. (See FLOT)
Leader: Celestin Azuluni Bembe
FRP
Forces Republicaines et Federalistes
The FRP seems to be self-defence cum political alliance of Banyamulenge distancing itself from the RCD (because
the RCD is not by definition specifically representing the Banyamulenge). The FRP is concerned with the survival of
the Banyamulenge that are not only threatened by the Kabila regime, but also by the various anti-Banyamulenge
militias operating in Katanga and parts of South Kivu. Very little is known about the defence structures of the FRP,
but it is believed to consists mainly out of Banyamulenge citizens organised in a type of "citizens-militia" protecting
localities under threat. No known offensive action has yet been undertaken by the FRP.
Leader: Joseph Mutambo
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Ex-Mobutu Generals And Ex-FAZIDSP Troops
Forces Armées Zaïroises/Zairian Armed Forces
Division Spéciale Présidentielle/Special Presidential Division
UNITA
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
LRA
Lord's Resistance Army
SPLA
Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNAREL
Union des Nasionalistes Républicains pour la Libération
MSPD
Mouvement pour la Sécurité, la Paix et le Développement
FNUA
Former National Ugandan Army
WNBF
West Nile Bank Front
NALU
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
Ugandan rebel group
Now largely wiped out
ADF
Allied Democratic Forces
A western Uganda rebel group with rear bases in the DRC.
Now thought to have been largely wiped out
Sources: IRINNews (2002), Deodatte (2002a & b), Banza Mbombo & Hemedi Bayoio, (2002)
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APPENDIX C: CONFLICT RESOLUTION TIMELINE
Date and Place Event Contents/Provisions/Comments
23 August 1998 Emergency Summit of SAOC Leaders Endorse the legitimacy of the ORC
Pretoria, South Government, call for an immediate ceasefire to
Africa be followed by political dialogue and a peaceful
settlement to the crisis. Frederick Chiluba
appointed as mediator.
7 September 1998 First peace talks organised by the An immediate ceasefire; a standstill by troops;
Victoria Falls, Congo's neighbours and a withdrawal offoreign troops, modalities
Zimbabwe to be worked out by the Secretary-Generals of
the UN and OAU.
The ORC Government rejected any negotiations
or ceasefire until Rwandan and Ugandan troops
withdraw.
22 October 1998 Talks aimed at seeking a diplomatic end Ceasefire
to the conflict Withdrawal of foreign troops and formation of a
Nelson Mandela & Paul Kagame national unity Government to embrace the
(Rwanda) rebels, with Kabila as President
29 October 1998 Meeting between Nelson Mandela &
Pretoria, South ORC rebel leader Wamba Dia Wamba
Africa
March 1999 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Voices hopes that the Security Council will
send peacekeepers as part of a peace settlement
5 April 1999 UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan Appoints former Senegalese Foreign Minister,
Mustapha Niasse, Special Envoy to the ORC.
9 April 1999 UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 1234 demanding "an
immediate halt to the hostilities"
18 April 1999 ORC/Uganda Ceasefire Accord Provided for the deployment of peacekeepers,
Sirte, Libya Kabila and the Presidents of Uganda, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the
Chad and Eritrea initiation of a national dialogue. Both the RCO
and Rwanda refused to be bound by the
agreement.
5 May 1999 Presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Call for ceasefire after summit
Dodoma, Tanzania
Tanzania
26 May 1999 Chad pulls out its troops from Congo
28 May 1999 Rwanda proclaims unilateral ceasefire
17 June 1999 Meeting of Regional Leaders -leaders ORC Summit scheduled for 25 June 1999 in
Pretoria, South from 14 SAOC member countries as Lusaka
Africa well as Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and
Kenya
10 July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed by Congolese rebel groups refused to sign because
Lusaka, Zambia six African states involved in the war they were excluded from the ceasefire
(ORC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, negotiations.
Uganda and Zambia)
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July-August 1999 Local peace efforts, including the
Catholic Church and rebel
administration, assemble 450 delegates
1 August 1999 Jean-Pierre Bemba signs the Lusaka
Agreement on behalf of the MLC
6 August 1999 UN Security Council authorises
deployment of UN liaison personnel in
support of the Lusaka agreement
31 August 1999 All 50 founding members of the RCD
signed the Lusaka Cease-fire
Agreement
18 September Lendu and Alur community leaders sign
1999, Rethy, DRe a non-aggression pact.
29 October 1999 4 hours of talks between Mandela & Agreed to ensure that a ceasefire was signed and
Windhoek, Nujoma peace was restored in the DRC
Namibia
30 November UN Security Council resolution 1279
1999 establishes MONUC
December 1999 Former President of Botswana,
Ketumile Masire, appointed to serve as
facilitator of the lCD provided for in the
Lusaka agreement
January 2000 The UN Security Council passes a
resolution for the deployment of 500
observers and 5,000 troops in the
Congo
24 January 2000 MONUC announces first phase of
deployment of liason officers to Bunia
24 February 2000 UN Security Council expands MONUC
in resolution 1291
18 March 2000 Kabila reportedly requests meeting with
Mbeki
26 March 2000 Mbeki & Kagame (Rwanda) meets for
"confidential" talks
29 March 2000 UNSC to send mission to DRC
9 May 2000 Ugandan MPs call for Withdrawal of
troops from Congo
2 June 2000 DRC: Joint military committee to set up
office in Kisangani
5 June 2000, Rwanda-DRC talks
Kenya
15 June 2000 UNSC begins 2-day meeting on DRC
22 June 2000 DRC Opposition slams govt as peace
mediator's office sealed
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28 June 2000 OAU Mediator Masire meets with
Rwandan President on DRC conflict
29 June 2000 RSA discussions on DRC Peacekeeping
mission
30 June 2000 Belgian Foreign Minister to meet DRC
Kisangani Rebels in Kisangani
2 July 2000 Ugandan, Rwandan leaders end
reconciliation talks, to demilitarize
Kisangani
12 July 2000 DRC Rebel Leader Bemba says
Government forces violate truce
19 July 2000 UN observers urge Govt troops, rebels
to end fighting in northwest
24 July 2000 SADC Defence Committee discuss
Angola, DRC conflicts
1 August 2000 OAU calls for collective actions to end
DRC conflict
14 August 2000 Peace Talks between Government Fail to reach agreement
Lusaka, Zambia Leaders and Rebels
16 January 2001 Laurent Kabila assassinated
15-16 January Unarmed opposition political parties in
2001, Brussels, the Democratic Republic of met.
Belgium "The Kinshasa Government and rebel
groups in the Congolese Rally for
Democracy (RCD) and the Movement
for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) will
not be invited to that meeting but may
attend as observers," Vervaeke told
journalists during a weekly news
briefing".
Sunday before 25 Summit: Angola, Namibia and Called for new peace moves in the DRC while
January 2001, Zimbabwe announcing that their troops would remain there
Luanda, Angola to ensure stability
25 January 2001 Joseph Kabila sworn in as DRC
President
(32-year old)
February 2001, A peace pact is signed between Hema Bemba, now the most senior rebel leader in the
Ituri, DRe and Lendu community leaders region states: "The milita will have to be
rtlC-:lrn"u:ort o:l"rt rt-icnp1"CPrt " A f"nl1rwlI_11't'\
16 Pan African News Agency (PANA). (2001). Unarmed DR Congo opposition groups to meet in Brussels.
http://wwww.reliefweb.intlw/rwb. nsf/s/D3131784ABOFD 15485256B 13006B2AEA (12 August 2002)
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commission is to monitor and move the process
forward
13 Feb 2001, Several heads of state To discuss the revival of the Lusaka Peace
Lusaka, Zambia Hosted by Frederick Chiluba Accord, signed 18 months ago but since
violated by all the signatories.
Stumbling blocks identified included the
disagreements between South Africa and
Zambia and the reduction of UN troops from
5000 to 4000.
March 2001 UN (MONUC) troops and observers
commence deployment.
21 & 22 April Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Issues: key issues which lie at the root of the
2001 signatory countries to the Lusaka crisis, such as Rwandan concerns over its
Accord, scheduled by the UN national security & UN deployment along the
Rwanda-DRC border
26 May 2001 An economic Iiberalisation programme
is launched
20-24 August Preparatory meeting for the ICO held
2001, Botswana
15 October 2001, First, abortive, meeting of the ICO
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia
16-20 November Subregional Conference on the
2001, Kinshasa, Protection of Women and Children in
DRC Armed Conflict
November 2001- Informal consultations between parties
February 2002, to the conflict to exchange views
New York,
Geneva and
Abuja
January 2002 Foreign Ministers of the UK and
France, Jack Straw and Hubert Vedrine
on a whistle-stop tour of the DRC,
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda in an
attempt to convince Kampala and
Kigali to withdraw their armies from
the DRC
4 January 2002, 4-day consultations between the
Geneva, Government, MLC and RCD
Switzerland
7 January 2002 Burundian Minister of Foreign Affairs, In ajoint communiqué issued on the occasion of
Thérene Sinunguruza visits the DRC the visit both Governments agree to restore the
and meets with President Kabila climate of mutual confidence. Burundi agreed to
proceed with the withdrawal of its troops and a
technical meeting in this regard was set up for
February.
8 January 2002, Meeting between high-level Discussions on how countries could add
Luanda, Angola representatives of the DRC, Angola, momentum to the Lusaka Agreement
Rwanda and Uganda
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14 January 2002, SADC Extraordinary Summit held to No substantive issues were discussed
Blantyre, Malawi discuss the situation in the Congo.
Uganda also present
14-17 January Informal meeting of representatives of To harmonise their views on transitions,
2002, Brussels, political opposition and civil society by elections, citizenship, the Constitution and
Belgium invitation from the Government of armed forces.
Belgium and in the presence of
observers from the facilitation, the UN,
the OAU and EU
26 January 2002 Speech by Joseph Kabila to Emphasised the commitment of the Government
commemorate the first anniversary of to the lCD, cooperation with MONUC for phase
his ascent to power III deployment and requests the Security
Council to establish an international
commission of enquiry into the nature of
Rwandan armed groups in the DRC
February 2002, Meeting of Congolese women from The adoption of the Nairobi Declaration
Nairobi, Kenya various parties.
5 February 2002 A press statement released by Calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict
representatives of the Mayi-Mayi. and demanding for the Mayi-Mayi the same
representation to al negotiations as the
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement
25 February 2002 Inauguration of the United Nations
Radio, Radio Okapi
25 February -19 Inter-Congolese Dialogue (lCD)
April2002
Sun City, South
Africa
19 March 2002 Adoption of Resolution 1399 (2002) by
the UN Security Council
April2002 The Sun City Accord, signed at the end Under that agreement, the Kinshasa
Sun City, South of the lCD by the Kinshasa Government of DRC President Joseph Kabila
Africa Government, the Ugandan-backed agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with the
Mouvement de liberation du Congo MLC, a majority of unarmed political
(MLC), a majority of unarmed political opposition groups, civil society organisations,
opposition groups, civil society and dissident factions of the pro-Rwandan
organisations, and Ugandan-backed Rassemb/ement congolais pour la Démocratie
dissident factions of the Rwandan- (RCD-Goma) armed opposition movement. The
backed rebel Rassemb/ement congolais MLC leader, Jean-Pierre Bemba, would serve as
pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma). prime minister of a transitional Government
leading to democratic elections.
The mainstream RCD-Goma, the Union pour la
Démocratie et le progres social and a number of
other unarmed political opposition groups
refused to sign the Sun City accord, calling it "a
big joke"
Kinshasa later denounced the accord followed
by the MLC threatening to resort back to force.
26 April 2002 RCD-Goma and UDPS announes the
creation of the Alliance for the
Safeguard of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue
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27 April- 7 May A UN Security Council mission Aims to give new impetus to the peace process
2002 comprising representatives of all 15 in the DRC, to support MONUCH in the
members conducts a tour of South country and to support parties to the conflict to
Africa, the DRC, Angola, Uganda, fulfil their obligations on the basis of the
Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda Lusaka agreement and resolutions passed by the
Council.
May 2002 France submits a proposal for a Great
Lakes conference to the UN
5 June 2002 Haile Menkarius of Eritrea and
Nairobi, Kenya Moustapha Niasse of Senegal, both of
whom worked closely with Masire at
the lCD, nominated to help Ketumile
Masire, facilitator of the inter-
Congolese dialogue (lCD), conduct
"shuttle diplomacy" to bring all parties
back to the negotiating table.
6 June - 5 July Talks on a transitional Government The Roman Catholic bishops have seized on the
2002, Matadi, which would also include the RCD, impasse reached at the talks, held in Matadi,
DRC UPDS and other opposition parties western DRC, from 6 June to 5 July, to call for
expanded discussions on a transitional
Government which would also include the
Rwandan-backed rebel Rassemblement
congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), Etienne
Tshisekedi's Union pour la Démocratie et le
progres social and other opposition parties
12 June 2002 Former Senegalese Prime Minister,
Moustapha Niasse apopointed as UN
Special Envoy to help push the lCD
forward.
14 June 2002 Adoption of UN Security Council Extends MONUC's mandate until 30 June 2003
Resolution 1417 (2002)
9 July 2002 Moustapha Niasse's second mission to To collect the views of the Congolese
the DRC negotiating partners on the power-sharing
during the transition
30 July 2002, Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Under that Pretoria Agreement, signed on July
Pretoria, South Kagame. 30, Kabila pledged to stop supporting and to
Africa disarm and regroup Rwandan Hutu rebels based
in the east of the DRC, in return for which
Kagame pledged to pull more than 20,000
Rwandan troops from the DRC.
August 2002 Consultations on the implementation of the Sun
City Agreement lead to agreement on 167
articles of the transitional constitution.
14-15 August Negotiations between representatives of Culminated in a memorandum of understanding
2002, Luanda, Uganda and the DRC under the that was signed on August 15 by Ugandan vice-
Angola Angolan Foreign Ministry, Joao prime minister and foreign Affairs, James
Miranda good offices. Waapkabolo and Congolese foreign minister
Katumba Muanke.
The document foresee the retiring of Uganda
soldiers in Congo (all Ugandan troops are to be
withdrawn by 15 December 2002) and the
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adoption of a set of mechanisms for normalizing
the two countries' bilateral relations.
16 August 2002 UN S-G Annan says UN Role in DRC
unclear
16 August 2002 RSA Foreign Minister Zuma in Uganda
for Talks on Defence Cooperation and
other issues
16 August 2002 Rwanda Accuses Kabila of Obstructing
Ceasefire Deal and suggests a blockade
16 August 2002 Uganda and South Africa discuss failed
DRC talks
16 August 2002 France to Give $ 3,000,000 to OAU for
DRC Peace Brokering Efforts
28 August 2002, A peace conference held for lturi. The Government has flown 24 regional leaders
Kinshasa, DRC and traditional chiefs from Ituri to Kinshasa to
attend the meeting - aimed at ending repeated
outbreaks of inter-ethnic hostilities in the
country's northeast. Fighting among different
ethnic groups in the Ituri city of Bunia from 5 to
9 August resulted in at least 110 deaths. The
Hema, a traditionally pastoral people, and the
Lendu, a traditionally agricultural people, have
frequently clashed over leadership in the region.
Uganda is accused of arming the Hema.
Only two traditional chiefs with real authority in
their communities are participating in this
conference. Other principal leaders of ethnic
groups involved in the conflict chose to boycott
the event in favour of meetings due to be
organised in Ituri.
Further meetings planned
30 and 31 August A meeting of members of parliament Uganda and Rwanda resolve to hold regular
2002,Kigali from Rwanda and Uganda meetings - at least once every three months - as
a means of promoting closer cooperation around
issues such as the repatriation of refugees and
dealing with alleged criminal fugitives in their
respective countries
3 September 2002 Open letter to Kabila by Bemba Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of the Mouvement de
liberation du Congo (MLC), has urged DRC
President Joseph Kabila to put aside their
differences in the interests of the country.
In an open letter to the President, he requested a
meeting at Kabila's convenience to end their
standoff and move the peace process forward.
6 September United Nations envoy Moustapha
2002, Niasse met leaders of the Congolese
Coma, DRC Rally for Democracy (DRC)
6 September Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni Provides for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops
2002, Luanda and the leader of the Democratic from the north of the DRC and the
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Republic of Congo (ORC), Joseph normalisation of relations between the ORC and
Kabila, on Friday signed a peace Uganda. Other details were not immediately
agreement aimed at ending the war in disclosed.
the vast central African nation.
The agreement was brokered by
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of
Angola
17 September Beginning of the withdrawal of
2002 Rwandan forces from the ORC.
MONUC confirms the withdrawal of20
941 soldiers from 21 assembly points
2 October 2002, Representatives of the political
Pretoria, South opposition and civil society held
Africa consultations under the auspices of the
Government of South Africa
21 October 2002 Publication of the report on the United
Nations Experts Panel on the illegal
exploitation of natural resources of the
ORC.
4 November 2002 End of consultations on a global and
inclusive agreement: Pretoria II
4 December 2002 Adoption of the Security Council
resolution 1445 (2002) reinforcing
MONUC
9 December 2002 Renewal of consultations on a global
and inclusive agreement: Pretoria II
17 December 2002 Signing of the Pretoria Accord Comprehensive peace deal signed at ICO talks
in Pretoria by the ORC Government, five armed
groups, the political opposition and civil society
30 December 2002 Signing of a ceasefire agreement in
Gbadolite between MLC, RCO-N and
RCO-KlML for a cessation of hostilities
in Ituri
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APPENDIX D: KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LUSAKA CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT
The Lusaka agreement recognizes the internal and external aspects of the conflict by linking
the following: internal democratization and national reconciliation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo; respect for its sovereignty; withdrawal of foreign forces and
accommodation of the legitimate security interests of neighbouring states. Its clauses include:
o Cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of the signing of the cease-fire agreement; a
ban on disseminating hostile propaganda, harassing civilians, inciting ethnic hatred
and moving arms and war material to the field
o Establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprising representatives of
the belligerents. Working with UN and OADobservers, it is to oversee troop
disengagement, develop procedures for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating
combatants, and ensure compliance with the cease-fire until UN peacekeepers arrive
o Release of prisoners and hostages; establishment of safe corridors for moving and
distributing humanitarian aid
o Re-establishment of Government administration, resumption of health, education and
other services, and free movement of people and goods throughout the country
o Selection of a mediator and beginning of an inclusive inter-Congolese dialogue based
on mutual respect and equality before the law for all ethnic groups and nationalities
within the DRC. Out of this dialogue shall emerge agreement on the composition of a
new national army, a new constitution and free elections
o Deployment of an "appropriate" UN peacekeeping force (within 120 days of the
signing of the agreement) to monitor the cease-fire, investigate violations with the
JMC; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate armed groups; arrest perpetrators of crimes
against humanity, including people suspected of involvement in genocide in Rwanda;
and oversee the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC
o Cooperation in security matters along common borders; no arming, training or
harbouring of armed opposition groups intent on destabilizing neighbouring states
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APPENDIX E: MONUC STRUCTURE AND MANDATE
Headquarters
Kinshasa; Democratic Republic of the Congo. Liaison offices in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bujumbura (Burundi),
Harare (Zimbabwe), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Lusaka (Zambia) and Windhoek (Namibia)
Duration
30 November 1999 to present
Authorisation
15 June 2002 to 30 June 2003 (UN Security Council Resolution 1417, 14 June 2002)
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chief of
Mission
Amos Namanga Ngongi (Cameroon)
Force Commander
Major-General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal)
Strength
Authorised strength: 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 military observers, supported by specialists in
human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, medical and
administrative support.
Strength (10 January 2002): 4,309 total uniformed personnel, including 445 military observers, 51 civilian
police and 3,803 armed troops. These are supported by 549 international and 636 local civilian personnel.
Contributors of military and civilian police personnel
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China.Cête
d'lvoire, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,
Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia.
Financial aspects
Method of financing: Assessments in respect ofa Special Account
Appropriations: 1 July 2002 - 30 June 2003: US$608.3 million (gross)
The United Nations is now posed to implement Phase III of the MONUC plan. Phase I
involved the arrival of the UN team and the stabilisation of the security environment. Phase II
has seen the pulling back of warring parties to new defensive positions approximately 30 kms
apart according to a plan signed in February 2001 and the insertion of 54 static UN
monitoring posts and 41 mobile teams.
Phase III, due to be implemented by mid-2002, will attempt the voluntary disarmament of
militias in the east - the so-called DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation,
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Resettlement and Re-insertion). In terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1376 of 2001,
this involves the establishment of forward deployment areas in Kisangani and Kindu, creating
between ten and fifteen reception/assembly areas for the rebel armed groups. This envisages a
UN force of around 10,000 (up from the January 2002 levels of 3,500) present for at least two
years.
Key features of the MONUe mandate
u Monitoring compliance with and investigating violations of the ceasefire agreement.
o Establishing and maintaining continuous contact with the field headquarters of the
parties' armed forces.
o Developing a plan of action for the disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of armed groups and the withdrawal of foreign forces.
o Facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring.
o Providing technical assistance and support for the facilitator of the inter-Congolese
dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire; working for the release of prisoners of war and
assisting UN and non-governmental agencies in humanitarian activities.
o Developing a national de-mining programme and conducting de-mining operations.
o MONDC is authorized under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter to take "necessary
action" to protect UN and JMC personnel and facilities, ensure its freedom of
operation and protect civilian populations under threat of attack "in the area of
deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems within its capabilities.
(Mills, 2002 & MONDC, 2002)
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APPENDIX F: THE PRETORIA AGREEMENT - DRCIRW ANDA
PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF
RWANDA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ON THE
WITHDRAWAL OF THE RWANDAN TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND THE DISMANTLING OF THE
EX-FAR AND INTERAHAMWE FORCES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO (DRC).
The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement of 1999 sets out modalities for the tracking down and
disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the territory of the DRC. To date, it has
not been possible to effectively implement the decisions relating to these armed groups.
The Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda
have sought to find an expeditious manner of implementing these decisions.
The Parties acknowledge that there have been numerous attempts to implement agreements
reached between them with regard to this matter. The Parties also acknowledge that the
launch of the African Union, recent UN resolutions and the involvement of a third party
present a window of opportunity to urgently resolve this matter.
By third party, both Parties understand this to refer to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and South Africa, in its dual capacity as Chairperson of the African Union and
facilitator of this process.
The Parties further acknowledge that the resolution of this matter will be a process and not an
event.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reaffirms its stated legitimate
right that the forces of the Government of Rwanda withdraw from the territory of the DRC
without delay.
The Government of Rwanda reaffirms its readiness to withdraw from the territory of the DRC
as soon as effective measures that address its security concerns, in particular the dismantling
of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, have been agreed to. Withdrawal should start
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simultaneously with the implementation of the measures, both of which will be verified by
MONUC, JMC and the third party.
The Interahamwe and ex-FAR armed groups fled to various countries, including the DRC,
after participating in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The DRC Government states that it does
not wish to have these armed groups present in the territory of the DRC. The DRC
Government does not want its territory to be used as a base for attacks against its
neighbouring countries.
The DRC Government is ready to collaborate with MONUC, the JMC and any other Force
constituted by the third party, to assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the
whole of the territory of the DRC.
In this regard, the Parties agree as follows:
The DRC Government will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the
Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control.
The DRC Government will collaborate with MONUC and the JMC in the dismantling of the
ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC.
The Rwandan Government undertakes to withdraw its troops from the DRC territory,
following the process outlined in paragraph 5. This will be according to measures as detailed
in the implementation programme.
That MONUC, acting together with all relevant UN Agencies, should be requested to
immediately set up processes to repatriate all Rwandese, ex-FAR and Interahamwe to
Rwanda, including those in Kamina, in co-ordination with the Governments of Rwanda and
the DRC.
The Governments of the DRC and Rwanda would provide the facilitator of this meeting and
the UN Secretary-General with all the information in their possession relating to these armed
groups.
The third party will take responsibility for verifying whatever information received, through
whatever measures deemed necessary.
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The Parties agree to accept the verification report from the third party.
That the UN considers changing the mandate of MONUC into a Peace-keeping mission.
MONUC should immediately proceed to implement Phase 3 of its DDRR and finalise its
deployment in the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the territory.
The Parties agree that their respective Governments would put into place a mechanism for the
normalisation of the security situation along their common border. This mechanism may
include the presence of an International Force to cooperate with the two countries, in the
short term, to secure their common border.
That a bilateral team, facilitated by South Africa and the UN Secretary-General, work on a
detailed calendar to implement this agreement.
Both Parties commit themselves to accepting the role and findings of the third party in the
process of implementing this agreement, and further accept that the commitments and
agreements reached in this Peace Agreement are binding.
(Government of South Africa 2002)
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APPENDIX G: SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS OF PRETORIA II
I - The Cessation of Hostilities:
1. All parties to the accord commit themselves to the immediate cessation of hostilities
in accordance with previous agreements and pertinent UN Security Council
Resolutions;
2. All parties commit themselves to engage in the formation of a unified national army
in conformity with the Resolution adopted on the lOth of April at the plenary to the
lCD in Sun City;
3. All parties commit themselves further to fully support the immediate implementation
of all UN Security Council Resolutions related to the withdrawal of foreign troops
and the disarmament of armed militias in order to safeguard the sovereignty and
integrity of the territory of the DRC;
4. The formation of a Government of National Unity to permit the organisation of free
and democratic elections;
5. The parties accept responsibility for the enactment of all measures necessary to ensure
the security of the population, the representatives to the transitional Government in
Kinshasa and the newly formed institutions.
II - Objectives of the transition
1. The reunification, pacification and reconstruction of the country, the restoration of its
territorial integrity and the re-establishment of central authority over the national
territory;
2. National reconciliation;
3. The formation of a national restructured and integrated defence force;
4. The organisation of free and transparent elections to put in place a democratic regime;
5. The creation of the necessary structures for a new political order.
IV - Duration of the Transition
The transition period takes effect from the investiture of the transition Government. The
election of a new President marks the end of the transition period. The election of the
President takes place after the legislative elections. The elections are to be held in the 24
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months that follow the start of the transition period. By reason of the problems specifically
linked to the organisation of elections, this period may be extended by 6 months, renewable
only once for a period of 6 months.
v - Institutions of the Transition
The President of the Republic
An Executive Government
A National Assembly
A Senate
The Courts and Tribunals
Institutions in support of democracy:
An Independent Electoral Commission
A Human Rights Observer
The high authority of the media
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission
A Commission of Ethics and Anti-Corruption
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Commission! Government RCD MLC Political Civil Society RCD-ML RCD-N Mai-Mai
Vice- Opposition
Presidencies
Commission l.Intérieur, 1. Défense, 1. Affaires 1. Justice 1. Droits 1. Coopération
politique Décentralisa- Démobilisation Etrangrëres et 2. Solidarité et humains réegionale
(RCD) tion et Sécurité et Anciens Coopération Affaires
2. Presse et Combattants Internationale Humanitaires
Information 2. Condition
feminine et
familie
Commission 3. Energie 3. Economie 2. Plan 2. Fonction 1. Commerce
économique et 4. Portefeuille 3. Budget Publique Extérieur
financiére 4. Agriculture
(MLC)
Commission 6. Santé 5. PTT 5. Travaux 2. Urbanisme 2. Tourisme 1. Développe-
pouria 7. Cultures et Publics et ment Rural
reconstruction Arts Infrastructures 2. Environne-
et la ment
développement
(Government)
Commission 6. Travail et 6. Enseigne-
sociale et Prévoyance ment Primaire
culturelle Sociale et Secondaire
(Political 7. 7. Jeunesse et
Opposition) Enseignement sports
Supéreieur et
Universitaire
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Table 1: The Ministries
National Assembly
Entity Number of representatives
RCD 94
MLC 94
Government 94
Political Opposition 94
Civil Society 94
RCD-ML 15
RCD-N 5
Mai-Mai 10
Total 500
Senate
Entity Number of Representatives
RCD 22
MLC 22
Government 22
Political Opposition 22
Civil Society 22
RCD-ML 4
RCD-N 2
Mai-Mai 4
Total 120
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APPENDIX H: THE NAIROBI DECLARATION
We, women of the Democratic Republic of Congo, representing the different components in
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, that is, Government, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la
Demoeratie (RCD), the political opposition and civil society, meeting in Nairobi, Kenya,
from 15th to 19th February 2002,
Conscious of the fact that we represent 52 per cent of the Congolese population, which
constitutes an inescapable force in the restoration and the maintenance of peace and the
development of our country;
Considering the real impact of atrocities of the war on the entire population;
Considering women, children, the aged, the sick and the handicapped under their care, are the
most vulnerable groups and victims of this war;
Profoundly pained by the blind violence against women and the girl child, such as rape,
forced prostitution, abductions, mutilations, and the killings, looting, psychological and
mental traumas, HIV/AIDS infections and sexually transmitted diseases;
Noting the tribal wars, massive dislocation of populations;
Deploring the recruitment of child soldiers in the armed conflict and the difficulties related to
their social and familial reintegration;
Considering the terrible consequences of the war on displaced and refugee populations, the
growing number of orphans and children resulting from rape;
Convinced of our wish and determination to become active in peace-building in our country,
Considering that, as mothers of the nation, we have a right, a duty and a responsibility
towards the Congolese people;
Considering the innate capacities in mediation, as mothers and spouses, and as custodians of
our traditions and our cultural values;
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Reaffirming our total support for all initiatives geared to reestablishing total and sustainable
peace in the DRC, and to its reconstruction and development;
Saluting the multidimensional efforts engaged by Congolese women themselves, the
development partners and all those who have demonstrated their solidarity to these struggles
(the African Women's Peace Committee, Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS), UNIFEM. the
agencies of the United Nations, diplomatic missions,);
Convinced that women's rights are human rights;
Considering about the under-representation of women in decision-making;
Convinced about the effective holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue;
We thus appeal to all parties involved in the Congo crisis to take account of the ardent wishes
of Congolese women, expressed in this Declaration and the attached Action Plan.
We call for the immediate halt to the hostilities and the immediate and effective withdrawal
of foreign troops from the Congolese territory;
We insist on the reunification of the country and respect for its territorial integrity;
We demand the application of good governance and the stability of the institutions;
We demand the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against
Women, ratified by the DRC, is mentioned in the preamble of the new constitution to be
adopted by the DRC;
That access to land and resources for women be legislated and instituted;
That affirmative action, such as a 30 per cent quota recommended by the Beijing Platform of
Action, be instituted as demonstration of good governance and democracy in order to
guarantee significant representation of women in all instances of decision-making;
That gender-sensitivity be mainstreamed across the entire Inter-Congolese Dialogue and that
its various components accept to take this into account.
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We demand the institution of an emergency humanitarian programme, which should include
women's organizations at all levels of its implementation.
We exhort all delegates to secure the reintegration and the rehabilitation of demobilized child
soldiers, street children and orphans, and the care of women and girls victims of the atrocities
described above.
We commit ourselves to address the priorities of women, children and other vulnerable
groups in all points in the agenda of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, to ensure that there is no
impunity for all criminal acts, and that rape is legislated as a crime against the humanity of
women.
We ardently appeal to the international community to appropriately take charge of the
Declaration and Action Plan of the women of the DRC, with budgets for its implementation.
We demand that the facilitator, His Excellency KETUMILE MASIRE, to incorporate the
Declaration of Nairobi and the Action Plans of the Congolese women in the Agenda of the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
Adopted in Nairobi: Tuesday, February 19,2002
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APPENDIX I: BRIEF OUTLINE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 1325
In the 18point resolution, the Security Council:
Cl Urges member states to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-
making levels.
Cl Encourages the Secretary General to implement his strategic plan of action
(N49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making
levels in conflict resolution and peace processes.
Cl Urges the Secretary General to appoint more women as special representatives and
envoys.
Cl Urges the Secretary General to expand the role and contributions of women in UN
field-based operations, including among military observers, civilian police, human
rights and humanitarian personnel.
Cl Requests the Secretary General to provide training guidelines and materials on the
protection, rights and particular needs of women.
Cl Urges member states to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical
support for gender sensitive training efforts.
Cl Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to
the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians.
Cl Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and
girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse.
Cl Emphasizes the responsibilities of all states to put an end to impunity and to prosecute
those responsible for genocide crimes, including those related to sexual and other
forms of violence against women and girls.
Cl Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian
characters of refugee camps and settlements with particular attention to women's and
girls' special needs.
Cl Invites the Secretary General to carry out a study to be presented to the Security
Council on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in
peace-building, the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and
progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions.
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APPENDIX J: THE SADC DECLARATION ON GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT
PREAMBLE
We, the Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community,
A. NOTING THAT:
i) Member States undertook in the SADC Treaty (Article 6 (2)) not to discriminate
against any person on the grounds of gender, among others;
ii) All SADC Member States have signed and ratified or acceded to the UN Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or are in the
final stages of doing so;
B. CONVINCED THAT:
i) Gender equality is a fundamental human right;
ii) Gender is an area in which considerable agreement already exists and ware there are
substantial benefits to be gained from closer regional co-operation and collective action.
iii) The integration and mainstreaming of gender issues into the SADC Programme of
Action and Community Building Initiative is key to the sustainable development of the
SADC region.
c. DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT:
i) While some SADC Member States have made some progress towards gender equality
and gender mainstreaming, disparities between women and men still exist in the areas of
legal rights, power sharing and decision making, access to and control over productive
resources, education and health among others;
ii) Women constitute the majority of the poor;
iii) Efforts to integrate gender considerations III SADC sectoral programmes and
projects have not sufficiently mainstreamed gender in coordinated and
comprehensive manner.
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D. RECOGNISING TRA T:
i) The SADC Council of Ministers in 1990 mandated the SADC Secretariat to explore
the best ways to incorporate gender issues in the SADC Programme of Work, and approved
in 1996 that gender issues at the regional level be coordinated by the Secretariat;
ii) In execution of this mandate, the SADC Secretariat has developed an maintained
working relations with key stakeholders in the area of gender, which resulted in the approval
and adoption of the SADC Gender Programme by the SADC Council of Ministers in
February 1997;
WE THEREFORE:
E. REAFFIRM our commitment to the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies, the
Africa Platform of Action and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
F. ENDORSE the decision of Council on:
i) The establishment of a policy framework for mainstreaming gender in all SADC
activities, and in strengthening the efforts by member countries to achieve gender equality.
ii) Putting into place an institutional framework for advancing gender equality consistent
with that established for other areas of cooperation, but which ensures that gender is routinely
taken into account in all sectors.
iii) The establishment of a Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Gender
Affairs in the region.
iv) The adoption of the existing Advisory Committee consisting of one representative
from Government and one member from Non Governmental Organisations in each Member
State whose task is to advise the Standing Committee of Ministers and other Sectoral
Committees of Ministers on gender issues.
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v) The establishment of Gender Focal Points whose task would be to ensure that gender
is taken into account in all sectoral initiatives, and is placed on the agenda of all ministerial
meetings.
vi) The establishment of Gender Unit in the SADC Secretariat consisting of at least two
officers at a senior level.
G. RESOLVE THAT:
As leaders, we should spearhead the implementation of these undertakings and ensure
the eradication of all gender inequalities in the region;
AND
H. COMMIT ourselves and our respective countries to, inter alia,
i) Placing gender firmly on the agenda of the SADC Programme of Action and
Community Building Initiative;
ii) Ensuring the equal representation of women and men in the decision making of
Member States and SADC structures at all levels, and the achievement of at least thirty
percent target of women in political and decision making structures by year 2005;
iii) Promoting women's full access to, and control over productive resources such as land,
livestock, markets credit, modem technology, formal employment, and a good quality of life
in order to reduce the level of poverty among women;
iv) Repealing and reforming all laws, amending constitutions and changing social
practices which still subject women to discrimination, and enacting empowering gender
sensitive laws;
v) Enhancing access to quality education by women and men, and removing gender
stereotyping in the curriculum, career choices and professions;
vi) Making quality reproductive and other health services more accessible to women and
men;
105
vii) Protecting and promoting the human rights of women and children;
viii) Recognising, protecting and promoting the reproductive and sexual rights of women
and the girl child;
ix) Taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of violence
against women and children;
x) Encouraging the mass media to disseminate information and materials in respect of
the human rights of women and children.
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